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INTRODUCTION
Over the last five years, there has been a well-documented increase in
the number of asylum seekers coming from the Northern Triangle of Central
America,1 many of whom are fleeing horrific human rights abuses including
gang and intrafamilial violence.2 Their claims have met with limited success.
Under U.S. law, applicants for asylum must demonstrate that, upon return to
their home countries, they would experience harms rising to the level of
persecution on account of a protected ground: race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
This last category has evolved to offer the most promise for asylum
claims that do not satisfy any of the other four bases of eligibility. As such,
“membership in a particular social group” has become a battleground
between those who would like to see asylum protection in the U.S. expanded
and those more inclined to limit its reach. A follower of the latter camp,
Attorney General Sessions issued Matter of A-B- in June 2018, rejecting the
claim of an asylum seeker who argued that she had been harmed as a member
1

Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras.
See EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, ADJUDICATION STATISTICS, https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1106366/download [https://perma.cc/W6DE-RWT2] (last updated
Jan. 23, 2020) (reflecting that 47,581 asylum applications were filed in fiscal year 2014,
63,701 in fiscal year 2015, 82,657 in fiscal year 2016, 144,983 in fiscal year 2017, 163,936
in fiscal year 2018, and 211,794 in fiscal year 2019). Between 2013 and 2015, the United
States received more affirmative asylum applications from the Northern Triangle “than in
the 15 years prior combined.” Maureen Meyer & Elyssa Pachico, Fact Sheet: U.S.
Immigration and Central American Asylum Seekers, WASH. OFF. ON LATIN AM. (Feb. 1,
2018), http://www.wola.org/analysis/fact-sheet-united-states-immigration-central-american
-asylum-seekers/ [https://perma.cc/7A8W-C9L4].
2
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of a particular social group defined by gender, nationality, and relationship
status.3 In addition to vacating the order from the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“the Board” or “BIA”) to grant asylum to Ms. A-B-, Sessions also
overruled Matter of A-R-C-G-, a groundbreaking 2014 decision that
recognized that domestic violence can be the basis for an asylum claim.4 In
doing so, Sessions opined that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to
domestic violence or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors5
will not qualify for asylum.”6
Despite this broad statement, a central tenet of asylum law is that each
case must be analyzed on its individual record and there can be no blanket
ruling for or against a certain particular social group or category of cases.7
However, the practical effect of decisions issued unilaterally by Attorneys
General cannot be underestimated. Following Matter of A-B-, attorneys
around the country reported heightened scrutiny and a higher rate of denial
of cases involving gender-based violence and gang violence.8 It is clear that
3

Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 317-21 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
Id. at 319.
5
An applicant for asylum must show either that the persecution is by the government or by
a private actor that the government is unwilling or unable to control. See 8 U.S.C. §
1158(B)(1) (2018) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)) (emphasis added) (linking the eligibility
for asylum to the refugee definition, which only requires that the applicant be “unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of” his or her country rather than have
been persecuted by that country); see, e.g., INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481-83 (1992)
(addressing a claim of persecution at the hands of non-governmental guerillas).
6
Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 320. The District Court Judge in Grace v. Whitaker found
that this constituted an impermissible blanket rule for claims involving domestic violence or gang
violence. 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018). Although this case specifically challenged the
application of Matter of A-B- and the corresponding U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services
policy memorandum in the context of credible fear determinations, many of the judge’s
conclusions are equally applicable to asylum and withholding of removal.
7
See, e.g., Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 242 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[A] social group
determination must be must be made on a case-by-case basis, because it is possible that under
certain circumstances, the society would make such a distinction and consider [a] shared past
experience to be a basis for distinction within that society.”).
8
See Kennji Kizuka, Central Americans Were Increasingly Winning Asylum Before
President Trump Took Office, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.human
rightsfirst.org/resource/central-americans-were-increasingly-winning-asylum-presidenttrump-took-office [https://perma.cc/LC4W-STJB] (connecting the drop in asylum grants for
Central Americans with the decision in Matter of A-B-); see also Dree Collopy, Matter of AB-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2019/01/31/matter-of-a-b-case-updatescurrent-trends-and-suggested-strategies/ [https://perma.cc/6UQX-UTS3] (noting that, after
Matter of A-B, “[p]ractitioners across the country have noticed the application of heightened
legal and evidentiary standards, and even the systematic and categorical denial of asylum
claims involving domestic and gang violence”).
4
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Matter of A-B- has given adjudicators who were already predisposed to deny
asylum substantially more ground to stand on.
The Trump Administration has propagated the message that we are
facing a crisis at the border to justify increasingly draconian immigration
policies.9 What this messaging ignores, however, is that this is a crisis of our
own making, borne in large part from these very policies. Not to discount the
very real human rights violations that immigrants are fleeing in their home
countries, the situation has been dramatically exacerbated by the
Administration’s choices, for example to restrict access to the border, to
separate families, and to ramp up detention in conditions that have been
likened to concentration camps.10 The attack on the legal framework for
asylum has received less attention but is in many ways more insidious.
There is an incredible amount of discretion involved in asylum
adjudication, as demonstrated by the fact that the single most important
variable in the success of an asylum application is the forum in which it is
heard. In 2018, the San Francisco Immigration Court granted almost 70% of
asylum cases whereas the Atlanta Court’s grant rate was 3.2%.11 A decision
9
See SARAH PIERCE, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION-RELATED POLICY CHANGES IN
THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 1 (2019), https://www.migrationpol

icy.org/research/immigration-policy-changes-two-years-trump-administration [https://per
ma.cc/J9KD-MUJH] (“After framing immigration as a threat to U.S. economic security and
public safety during his campaign, upon taking office Trump immediately turned his
administration’s focus to immigration enforcement by signing two executive orders . . . .”).
10
See, e.g., Julia Love, Asylum Seekers Anxiously Cross into U.S. As New Policy Kicks in,
REUTERS (July 17, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-mexicoborder/asylum-seekers-anxiously-cross-into-us-as-new-policy-kicks-in-idUSKCN1UC2VH
[https://perma.cc/6YSE-EGYC] (“[New U.S. policy] requires asylum-seekers crossing a
third country on the way to the United States to first pursue safe-haven there, precluding
claims for the thousands who traverse Central American countries and Mexico to reach the
U.S. border.”); U.S.: Family Separation Harming Children, Families, HUM. RIGHTS FIRST
(July 11, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/11/us-family-separation-harming-chil
dren-families [https://perma.cc/AZF4-6J8D] (“United States officials are separating migrant
children from their families at the border . . . .”); Charles M. Blow, Trump’s ‘Concentration
Camps,’ N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/opinion/trumpmigrants-camps.html [https://perma.cc/XX7T-3FFF] (explaining that migrant children have
been separated from their parents and are being held in conditions more akin to concentration
camps than summer camp).
11
See Asylum Decisions in San Francisco in 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION: ASYLUM
DECISIONS, https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/asylum/ [https://perma.cc/US9Z-LHT
N] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020) (set “Immigration Court” filter to San Francisco, “Fiscal Year
of Decision” filter to 2018, and select “Decision” filter) (showing that the San Francisco
immigration court granted 1,620 applications out of 2,392, or 68%); see also Asylum
Decisions in Atlanta in 2018, TRAC IMMIGRATION: ASYLUM DECISIONS, https:// trac.syr.edu
/phptools/immigration/asylum/ [https://perma.cc/US9Z-LHTN] (last visited Jan. 28, 2020)
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like Matter of A-B- that did not actually change the law, but was teeming with
restrictionist dicta, clearly emboldens less-refugee-friendly judges and
suggests to migrants that it may be safer to enter the country without
inspection than try their luck at “refugee roulette.”12
In 2018, the Board issued a precedential decision requiring asylum
applicants to clearly delineate in Immigration Court to which particular social
group they are claiming membership in order to preserve them on appeal.13 It is
now that much more critical in all cases, but especially those involving domestic
or gang violence, for applicants not to overlook any workable legal theories.
One promising line of argumentation is family-based particular social group
membership. There is ample jurisprudence accepting the family as a cognizable
social group and indicating that there is nexus to a protected ground when the
persecutor was motivated by the applicant’s relationship to a family member.14
In May 2018, the Board published Matter of L-E-A-, its first and only
precedential decision on persecution on account of family membership.15 Six
months later, Interim Attorney General Whitaker referred Matter of L-E-Ato himself, staying the decision and requesting amicus briefing on the
circumstances under which an asylum claim based on family membership
should be granted.16 On July 29, 2019, Attorney General Barr, who replaced
Whitaker in February 2019, issued his decision, asserting that most families
will not qualify as particular social groups.17 Family-based claims have since
(set “Immigration Court” filter to Atlanta, “Fiscal Year of Decision” filter to 2018, and select
“Decision” filter) (showing that the Atlanta immigration court granted only 14 applications
out of 430, or 3%).
12
The “refugee roulette” phrase was coined in Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz & Philip
Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007).
13
Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018) (holding that an
applicant must delineate all particular social groups on the record before the Immigration
Judge and that the Board will generally not consider new groups not previously advanced
before the Immigration Judge).
14
See infra Section I, which presents an overview of the law, including analyses of multiple
cases in which family was accepted as a cognizable particular social group and nexus was
found to be satisfied.
15
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 41 (B.I.A. 2017).
16
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494 (Att’y Gen. 2018). The Attorney General
may review decisions de novo under 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(h) and supersede the authority of the
immigration judge and the Board. Deportation Proceedings of Joseph Patrick Thomas
Doherty, 12 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7 (1988). The previous two Attorneys General referred cases to
themselves just four times in eight years whereas Attorney General Sessions certified seven
cases to himself in the course of twenty-one months. Lorelei Laird, Whose Court Is This
Anyway? Immigration Judges Accuse Executive Branch of Politicizing Their Courts, A.B.A.
J. (Apr. 1, 2019), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/immigration-judges-execu
tive-politicizing-courts [https://perma.cc/NPM2-4652].
17
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581.
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become more difficult to win, though the decision and accompanying
guidance from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)18 have
recently been challenged in court.19 With the Administration aiming to make
family-based particular social groups the latest casualty in its war on asylum
seekers, the goal of this Article is for practitioners and legal scholars alike to
understand the underpinnings of a family-based theory of persecution, the
longstanding case law that supports it, and the dangers as well as the
limitations of the Attorney General’s decision.
Part I analyzes the existing state of the law on particular social groups
involving families, including Matter of L-E-A-, circuit court rulings,
unpublished decisions,20 as well as international and comparative
jurisprudence. Part II explores the practical application of family-based
particular social groups, offering lessons from case law about how best to
argue both that a social group defined by family is cognizable and that nexus
has been satisfied.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
To determine whether a particular social group is cognizable, an
applicant must demonstrate that the group is (1) composed of members
who share a common immutable characteristic; (2) is socially distinct; and
(3) is defined with particularity.21
18

U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR,
CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF L-E-A(2019), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2019/USCIS_Me
morandum_LEA_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3PD-YJ8W] [hereinafter USCIS L-E-AGUIDANCE]; Complaint at Exhibit A, S.A.P. v. Barr, No. 1:19-cv-03549 (D.D.C. Nov. 22,
2019) [hereinafter S.A.P. Complaint] (explaining the U.S. Citizenship & Immigration
Services’ September 2019 revisions to “Credible Fear of Persecution and Torture
Determinations” training materials).
19
See generally id.
20
The unpublished decisions included in this Article are from the Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies (CGRS) and the Immigrant & Refugee Appellate Center, L.L.C. (IRAC).
CGRS collects decisions through its technical assistance program, which provides
consultation and litigation resources to attorneys. Technical Assistance and Training, CTR.
FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/technical-assistancetraining [https://perma.cc/4HAC-8J77] (last visited June 11, 2019). The IRAC publishes a
monthly Index of Unpublished Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals. See Index of
Unpublished Decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals, IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE APP.
CTR., www.irac.net [https://perma.cc/9QEE-HNK3] (last visited June 11, 2019).
21
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A. 2014); see also Matter of A-B-, 27
I. & N. Dec. 31, 320 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (articulating the same three-factor test). Although the
Board endeavored to clarify the particularity and social distinction tests in Matter of M-E-V-
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First, members of the group must share common characteristics which
are either immutable or so fundamental that they cannot or “should not be
required to change” them.22 Second, the group must be defined with sufficient
particularity such that it has “well-defined boundaries” and constitutes a
“discrete class of persons.”23 It must be easy to determine who is a member
of the group and who is not. Thus, the terms used to describe the group must
have “commonly accepted definitions in the society of which the group is a
part.”24 Third, the social distinction prong requires that members of the group
be “set apart, or distinct, from other persons within the society in some
significant way. In other words . . . those with the characteristic in the society
in question would be meaningfully distinguished from those who do not have
it.”25 The Board explained, “The perception of the applicant’s persecutors
may be relevant, because it can be indicative of whether society views the
G- and its companion case, Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), the more
legally defensible standard for determining cognizability is that asserted in Matter of Acosta,
that a particular social group must be defined by characteristics that are immutable or
fundamental. Acosta was the first articulation by the Board of the legal standard for particular
social group membership. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). It was not until decades
later in Matter of S-E-G and Matter of E-A-G that the Board added the particularity and social
distinction tests. 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 582-83 (B.I.A. 2008); 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 593-94
(B.I.A. 2008) To impose additional requirements solely on social group claims and not the
other protected grounds violates the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning “of the same
kind.” See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. at 233 (using the ejusdem generis doctrine to interpret
particular social group as requiring the same type of characteristics inherent in the other
protected grounds in the refugee definition). In fact, not all circuits have applied Chevron
deference to the Board’s imposition of the particularity and social distinction requirements.
See, e.g., Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2013) (deferring to the Board’s
definition of social group in Acosta while failing to mention S-E-G or E-A-G); W.G.A. v.
Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 964-65 & n.4 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018) (refusing
to make a Chevron determination about particularity and social distinction). While this
Article argues that family-based particular social groups satisfy social distinction and
particularity, this is not intended to validate the Board’s current approach to social group
claims.
22
Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233.
23
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 245, 249; see also Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d
940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating that the court will consider “whether the group can be
defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership”); Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. at 584 (“The essence of the ‘particularity’ requirement, therefore, is whether the
proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group
would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons.”).
24
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239; see also Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I.
& N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (rejecting the proposed group as “too amorphous to
provide an adequate benchmark for determining group membership”).
25
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 238; see also Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec.
at 217 (requiring “evidence showing that society in general perceives, considers, or
recognizes persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group”).
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group as distinct. However, the persecutors’ perception is not itself enough
to make a group socially distinct . . . .”26 The key inquiry is therefore whether
the specific society views the group members as distinct and treats members
differently in some way.27
The majority of adjudicators agree that family-based particular
social groups meet the requirements for cognizability.28 In Matter of Acosta,
the first decision to define particular social group membership, the Board
explicitly mentioned “kinship ties” as a characteristic that can comprise a
cognizable social group.29 The Board went on to repeatedly refer to families
as the paradigmatic example of a particular social group.30 Most of the
circuit courts have joined the Board in accepting family-based groups as
cognizable.31 There is widespread consensus that nuclear families can
constitute a cognizable social group, and many adjudicators have also
26

Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242.
Id.
28
See infra Section II.A for a more detailed discussion of how family-based particular social
groups meet the requirements for cognizability.
29
See Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985) (“[W]e interpret the phrase
‘persecution on account of membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that
is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a
common, immutable characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as
sex, color, or kinship ties . . . .” (emphasis added)).
30
See, e.g., Matter of C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959 (B.I.A. 2006) (“Social groups based on
. . . family relationship are generally easily recognizable and understood by others to
constitute social groups.”); Matter of H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342 (B.I.A. 1996) (finding
clan membership to constitute a cognizable particular social group because it was
“inextricably linked to family ties”).
31
See, e.g., Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[T]he family remains the
quintessential particular social group.”); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 125-26
(4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) and the
BIA opinion) (agreeing that family is a “prototypical” particular social group and finding the
family members of “those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to be
prosecutorial witnesses” as sufficiently particular and socially distinct); Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,
585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[A]s acknowledged by this court and by other circuits, a
family is a ‘particular social group’ if it is recognizable as a distinctive subgroup of society.”);
Vumi v. Gonzalez, 502 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007) (remanding a case to consider the
applicant’s claim of persecution based on membership in her husband’s family and noting
that that “the Board has held unambiguously that membership in a nuclear family may
substantiate a social-group basis of persecution”); Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzalez, 419 F.3d 877, 881
(8th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that “a nuclear family can constitute a social group”); Iliev v. INS,
127 F.3d 638, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (confirming that that 7th Circuit case law “has suggested, with
some certainty, that a family constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ within the meaning
of the law”); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no
plainer example of a social group based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics
than that of the nuclear family.”); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that the family provides “a prototypical example of ‘a particular social group’”).
27
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recognized groups that encompass more extended family members.32
In order to be eligible for asylum, applicants must demonstrate not only
that they are members of a cognizable particular social group, but that there is a
nexus to the persecution: that they were harmed because of this group
membership.33 There is a longstanding recognition that persecutors may have
mixed motives when targeting individuals; for that reason, so long as a protected
ground was “one central reason” for the persecution, the nexus is deemed
sufficient.34 Furthermore, the applicant does not bear the “unreasonable burden”
of establishing the persecutor’s exact motivation35 but can satisfy the nexus
requirement through direct evidence, such as statements made by the persecutor
and circumstantial evidence including country conditions documentation, a
pattern of harm to others similarly-situated, and the timing of the persecution.36
32

See infra Subsection I.C.1 and Section II.A.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2018) (including in the definition of a refugee that
persecution be “on account of” a protected ground). The U.S. puts the burden of proof on the
asylum seeker to provide evidence of the persecutor’s motive. Id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); INS.
v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that the applicant must provide at least
some evidence of motive). “One central reason” for the persecution must be a protected
ground, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i), as amended by §101(a) of the REAL ID Act, P.L. 10913, 119 Stat. 302 (2005). However, adjudicators in the U.S. frequently ignore the doctrine of
mixed motives and seem to require that the sole cause of the persecution be a Convention
ground. See Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the
Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265, 270-73 (2002) (stating that in practice, courts
frequently apply the effective sole cause test by rejecting the Convention-related
explanations for persecution and hypothesizing about the alternative non-Convention
grounds for the persecution). Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that
the UNHCR applies a lower burden of proof for a finding of nexus, for example indicating
that “[o]ften the applicant himself may not be aware of the reasons for the persecution feared.
It is not, however, his duty to analyze his case to such an extent as to identify the reasons in
detail.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR
DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 66 (1992). Some foreign jurisdictions, such as
Canada, also apply a less stringent nexus test, requiring that a Convention ground be “a
reason” but not “one central reason” for the persecution. See infra note 209.
34
Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007) (“[T]he protected ground
cannot play a minor role . . . . That is, it cannot be incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate
to another reason for harm. Rather, it must be a central reason for persecuting the respondent”);
see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 130 (D.D.C. 2018) (“The INA expressly
contemplates mixed motives for persecution when it specifies that a protected ground must be
‘one central reason’ for the persecution.” (citing to 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i))).
35
Matter of Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658, 662 (B.I.A. 1988).
36
See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (describing how plaintiffs must
provide proof of a persecutors’ motives, but that proof may be direct or circumstantial); see
also RAIO COMBINED TRAINING COURSE: NEXUS AND THE PROTECTED GROUNDS, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS.18-20 (2012), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/
33
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In the context of particular social group claims, whether or not the
persecution was on account of the applicant’s membership in the group is a
question that should be entirely separate from inquiries into whether the group
is cognizable and whether the applicant is a member of the group. It is possible
for an applicant to present a cognizable particular social group and to
demonstrate membership in this group, but then for the adjudicator to find that
there is insufficient evidence that one central reason that the persecutor harmed
the applicant was the group membership. Social group cognizability is
usually considered a legal issue with nexus typically categorized as a
finding of fact.37 This distinction is significant because findings of fact are
reviewed by the Board under a “clearly erroneous” standard,38 whereas questions
of law may be reviewed de novo.39 Similarly, the federal courts of appeal limit
their review to questions of law40 and treat findings of fact as conclusive “unless
any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”41
As such, adjudicators predisposed to deny asylum may do so based on a lack of
nexus, interpreting the facts to support the conclusion that the persecutor was not
motivated by the family relationship. Ruling on nexus rather than social group
cognizability increases the likelihood that a decision will survive appeal given
the highly deferential standard of review for findings of fact.
A. Purported Circuit Split
Some circuits considering family-based cases have consistently
questioned whether the persecutor was motivated by reasons unrelated to family
membership, such as general criminal intent, a desire for financial gain, or
files/nativedocuments/Nexus_minus_PSG_RAIO_Lesson_Plan.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYX3N8LF] (outlining examples of direct and circumstantial evidence of the persecutor’s motive).
37
See, e.g., Hincaipe v. Att’y Gen., 494 F.3d 213, 218 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[T]he question of
whether persecution is on account of . . . protected grounds is fact-specific.”); Silva v.
Attorney General, 448 F.3d 1229, 1236 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the review of
petitioner’s credible evidence of past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution is
considered an administrative fact finding); Jahed v. INS, 356 F.3d 991, 1003 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“Whether persecution is ‘on account of’ a petitioner’s political opinion is a question of fact;
it turns on evidence about the persecutor’s motive.”). But see Menghesha v. Gonzales, 450
F.3d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 2006) (“In this instance, however, we are concerned with the IJ’s
legal conclusions, not factual findings. We find that the IJ erred as a matter of law in holding
[petitioner] to an overly stringent legal standard: proving that political persecution was the
government’s sole motive.”); Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1990)
(addressing the sufficiency of the petitioner’s testimony about motive as a legal question).
38
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i) (2019).
39
Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(ii).
40
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) (2018).
41
Id. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
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revenge.42 Others, in particular the Fourth Circuit, have been more inclined to
find nexus to the family-based particular social group even when the persecutor
also had other reasons for targeting the victim unrelated to a protected ground.43
Another central dispute around family claims among the circuits focuses on the
reason the initial family member was targeted (hereinafter referred to as the
“defining family member”). There is considerable variation among the courts as
to whether the “defining family member” need also have been persecuted on
account of a protected ground in order for the applicant to be eligible for asylum.
For example, in Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, the petitioner’s brother, a gang
member, was killed by a rival gang, after which the petitioner, her parents, and
her brother’s wife were threatened.44 The facts do not support any obvious claim
for refugee protection by the “defining family” member, the deceased brother in
this case. Given that the brother may not have been himself targeted on account
of a protected ground, it is unclear whether this would disqualify the petitioner’s
family as a cognizable particular social group. However, the Fifth Circuit
essentially circumvented the issue by concluding that the gangs were targeting
the petitioner, not because of her family relationship, but to obtain information
that they believed her brother had given her,45 noting, “there is no reason to
suppose that those who persecute to obtain information also do so out of
hatred for a family, or vice versa.”46 The Court explicitly declined to address
the issue of whether the petitioner’s proposed particular social group of her
family was cognizable.47
Reaching more directly the issue of whether the “defining family
member” need be persecuted on account of a protected ground, the Seventh
Circuit in Yin Guan Lin v. Holder considered the case of a Chinese petitioner
who was threatened and detained by debt collectors from whom his father had
borrowed money.48 In denying the petition to review, the Court acknowledged
that “the family unit can constitute a social group” but found that the petitioner’s
42

See, e.g., Marin-Portillo v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]he record
adequately supports the IJ’s finding . . . that the threats against [petitioner] stemmed not from
. . . kinship ties . . ., but rather . . . retaliation”); Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 822,
824-26 (8th Cir. 2016) (holding that persecution based on wealth is not a cognizable social
group and targeting only wealthy family members fails to provide the required nexus);
Demiraj v. Holder, 631 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding that the persecution against
petitioner was based on revenge as opposed to family ties); see also infra note 103
(discussing cases in which the persecutors were found to be motivated by financial gain).
43
For Fourth Circuit case law following Matter of L-E-A-, see infra Subsection I.C.3.
44
Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 2015).
45
See id. at 492-93 (differentiating between persecuting to obtain information about a relative
and persecuting because of status as a relative).
46
Id. at 493.
47
Id. at 492.
48
Yin Guan Lin v. Holder, 411 F. App’x 901, 903 (7th Cir. 2011).
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persecution was not on account of his family membership.49 The Court
concluded, “[a]ny harm that Lin faced arose from a personal dispute between his
father and his father's creditors. Debtors who fear creditors do not qualify for
social-group membership.”50 Because the “defining family member” had been
targeted due to what the Court deemed to be a personal dispute around
attempts to collect a debt, his son was also not eligible for protection.51
In contrast, the Fourth Circuit in Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch remanded
a case involving a petitioner who had been threatened by gang members who
wanted her son to join the gang.52 The Board denied asylum based on lack of
nexus, finding that the petitioner was threatened because she opposed her son’s
involvement in criminal activity rather than on account of her family
membership.53 Even though the petitioner’s son had not been harmed for a
protected reason,54 the Fourth Circuit concluded, “Hernandez’s relationship to
her son is why she, and not another person, was threatened with death if she
did not allow him to join Mara 18, and the gang members’ demands leveraged
her maternal authority to control her son’s activities.”55 The Ninth Circuit came
to a similar decision in Flores-Rios v. Lynch, in which the petitioner argued that
he had been persecuted because of his family’s opposition to a gang, including
that his cousin had agreed to testify against a gang member.56 The Court
remanded the case to address whether the petitioner had been persecuted due to
his family membership, citing to previous precedent in which the Circuit had
“declined to hold . . . ‘that a family can constitute a particular social group

49

See id. at 905 (qualifying how the family unit may be a social group).
Id. at 905-06. It is not entirely clear from the decision, but the court seemed to imply that
the very cognizability of the petitioner’s particular social group turned on whether his father
had been persecuted on account of a protected ground, a position that conflates the separate
issues of cognizability and nexus.
51
Id.
52
Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 947 (4th Cir. 2015).
53
Id. at 949.
54
Cases involving gang recruitment have been largely unsuccessful, finding a lack of nexus
to a protected ground. See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 590 (B.I.A. 2008)
(“We concur with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the respondents failed to demonstrate
that either Salvadoran youth who refused recruitment into the MS-13 criminal gang or their
family members constitute a particular social group.”); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec.
591 (B.I.A. 2008) (“[W]e find that the particular social group identified by the Immigration
Judge as ‘persons resistant to gang membership’ lacks the social visibility that would allow
others to identify its members as part of such a group.”).
55
See Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d at 950 (describing how family ties do not have to be the
central or even the dominant reason for persecution, but that they must only be more than an
incidental or superficial reason).
56
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1125 (9th Cir. 2015).
50
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only when the alleged persecution on that ground is intertwined with’ another
protected ground.”57
In 2016, the Board published an amicus invitation to consider the question:
Where an asylum applicant has demonstrated persecution
because of his or her membership in a particular social group
comprised of the applicant’s family, has he or she satisfied the
nexus requirement without further analysis? Or does the
family constitute a particular social group only if the defining
family member also was targeted on account of another
protected ground?58
The Board specifically requested that parties compare the Fourth
Circuit’s Hernandez-Avalos and the Ninth Circuit’s Flores Rios with the Fifth
Circuit’s Ramirez-Mejia and the Seventh Circuit’s Lin v. Holder.59 Although
the Board in effect was indicating that there was a circuit split, a closer read of
the named cases––as well as additional case law across jurisdictions––reveals
that the inconsistencies in rulings may not actually rise to the level of a split.60
Regardless, it is clear that the issue was ripe for the Board’s consideration given
that adjudicators at all levels in all circuits were, and still are, applying
57

See id. at 1128 (citing to Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir.
2005), judgment vacated, 547 U.S. 183 (2006)); see also Hernandez-Ramos v. Sessions, 686
F. App’x 385, 387 (9th Cir. 2017) (indicating that the B.I.A. applied the incorrect legal
standard in requiring that the respondent provide evidence that the deaths of his family
members occurred on account of a protected ground); Sanchez-Canizalez v. Holder, 520 F.
App’x 528, 530 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that the petitioner was not required to show that
another family member was persecuted on account of a protected ground).
58
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Amicus Invitation, No. 16-01-11 (Jan. 11, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/eoir/file/811976/download [perma.cc/A7RL-HKUE].
59
The amicus invitation also included the Eight Circuit’s Malonga v. Holder in the category
of circuits that require nexus as to the “defining family member.” 621 F.3d 757 (8th Cir.
2010). However, this case is not as instructive in the analysis of social group claims because
the petitioner did not actually assert that he was targeted on account of his family
membership, but rather relied on political opinion and ethnicity claims. Id.at 763. The
petitioner did argue that his father, wife, and child were harmed, but the court did not comment
on the extent to which the facts might support a family-based argument. Id. Although not
referenced in the amicus invitation, it is also worth noting that the First Circuit joined the Fourth
Circuit and Ninth Circuit in clearly stating that the “defining family member” need not
demonstrate nexus to a protected ground. See Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9, 15 (1st
Cir. 2014) (“The law in this circuit and others is clear that a family may be a particular social
group simply by virtue of its kinship ties, without requiring anything more.”).
60
A deeper dive into this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. For more, see, e.g., Rachel
M. Lee, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Board of Immigration Appeals Must Remind
Courts That Family Is the Quintessential Particular Social Group to Prevent Courts from
Sidestepping Family-Based Asylum Claims, 50 CREIGHTON L. REV. 405, 427 (2017) (arguing
the “purported circuit split does not exist” because “the cases identified as creating a split
merely add ambiguity to the issue and do not directly contradict the well-settled precedent”).
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inconsistent reasoning to cases involving family-based targeting and often
conflating the separate issues of cognizability and nexus. In fact, the Board’s
amicus instruction itself appears to do just this by suggesting that the
cognizability of a social group defined by family might depend on the
motivations of the persecutor.61 The Board attempted to clarify the parameters
of permissible family-based claims in its first published decision on the issue,
Matter of L-E-A-, but still left quite a bit of room for confusion.
B. Matter of L-E-A- as Decided by the Board
Despite conflating the issues in its amicus invitation, the Board
analyzed the cognizability of the particular social group in L-E-Aindependently from nexus and explicitly acknowledged this distinction,
citing to Matter of W-G-R-, which emphasized the need to “separate the
assessment [of] whether the applicant has established the existence of one of
the enumerated grounds . . . from the issue of nexus. The structure of the Act
supports preserving this distinction, which should not be blurred . . . .”62 In
L-E-A-, the Mexican respondent faced threats from cartel members after his
father refused to let them sells drugs in his store.63 The cartel members also
approached the respondent himself to ask him to sell drugs from his father’s
store, and he refused.64 The Board opened by recognizing that the particular
social group consisting of the respondent’s father’s immediate family was
cognizable, citing much of the aforementioned case law as well as the fact that
both parties were in agreement on the issue.65 In its supplemental brief
submitted in response to the Board’s amicus invitation, the Department of
Homeland Security (“the Department” or “DHS”) asserted that an immediate
family member will “generally meet the social distinction test” since “virtually
all societies draw significant distinctions” around immediate family
relationships.66 The Board accepted this reasoning, stating that the respondent, a
son living at home with his father, was undoubtedly a member of the particular
social group.67 The Board did not squarely address the limits of cognizability
61

See id. (asking whether a family group needs to show that “the defining family member
was also targeted on account of another protected ground” in order to constitute a particular
social group).
62
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43 (B.I.A. 2017) (citing to Matter of WG-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014)).
63
Id. at 41.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 43.
66
Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief at 9, In re Alba, No. A200 553 090 (B.I.A.
2016) [hereinafter DHS 2016 Brief].
67
L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 43.
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when it comes to family-based particular social group membership. However,
leaving room for groups beyond nuclear families, the decision peripherally
mentioned that “the inquiry in a claim based on family membership will depend
on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those
relationships are regarded by the society in question.”68 This statement aligns
with the Department’s suggestion in its brief that in some societies, “extended
family groupings may have greater social significance, such that they could
meet the requirement of social distinction.”69
Having taken no issue with the particular social group, the Board
turned next to nexus. The Board first laid out the “easy” scenarios in which
nexus to a particular social group defined by family would clearly be found––
where a persecutor has an animus against the family itself70 or where the family
status is connected to another protected ground, such as political opinion.71 The
Board then contended that “nexus is not established simply because a particular
social group of family members exists and the family members experience
harm,”72 or because the persecutor targeted the victim as a means to an end,
“especially if the end is not connected to another protected ground.”73
Through this repeated commentary about the relevancy of connecting the
persecution to a non-family-based protected ground, the Board intimated that
a family-based claim should fail where the “defining family member” was
not persecuted for Convention reasons.74 However, in the final footnote of
the decision, the Board made the opposite point, saying, “[w]e accept the
parties’ position that a separate, independent inquiry into the motivation of a
persecutor towards the respondent’s father, as the defining or primary family
member, is not part of the nexus calculus.”75
The Board ultimately interpreted the facts of the case to find that there
was no nexus to the respondent’s family relationship because the cartel was
motivated only by a desire to increase its profits.76 L-E-A- thus mirrored much
of the existing precedent: acknowledging the cognizability of family-based
particular social groups, offering seemingly contradictory statements around
nexus and the requirements as to the “defining family member,” and
68

Id.
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 9.
70
L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 44 (giving as an example the Bolshevik assassinations of the
Romanovs).
71
Id. at 45 (citing to Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2009); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502
F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir. 2007); Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir. 1993)).
72
L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 45.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 46 n.5.
76
Id. at 46-47.
69
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ultimately circumventing the issue entirely by defaulting to the position that
the respondent was not harmed due to his family membership at all.
C. Board Decisions Post–L-E-AIn the wake of the Board’s decision in L-E-A-, there remained a lack
of clarity around how to analyze family-based asylum claims. At the
immigration judge level, decisions have been varied, with some judges
challenging the very cognizability of family-based particular social groups
and others easily finding nexus.77 The Board has not published any further
decisions implicating family-based particular social group membership since
L-E-A-. Of the eleven unpublished Board decisions subsequent to L-E-A- that
were identified in researching this Article, four of the appeals were dismissed
and seven sustained. Although unpublished decisions have no precedential
value, it is still instructive to delve into the reasoning of such decisions to
identify some patterns in how the Board analyzed family-based claims
subsequent to its decision in L-E-A-.
1. Family-based particular social groups, including those involving
extended families, can be cognizable
Ten out of eleven of the unpublished Board decisions found the
family-based particular social group that the respondents had asserted to be
cognizable. For the most part, the Board did not engage in any kind of robust
rationale for this finding, indicating that the cognizability of a social group
comprised of family members remained uncontroversial following the
Board’s decision. However, this limited analysis is exactly what Attorney
General Barr used to justify his overruling of the Board’s cognizability
finding in Matter of L-E-A-.78
The Board also accepted, with virtually no discussion, family-based
particular social groups consisting of non-nuclear family members in three of
the eleven cases. In one, Matter of H-G-N-, the Board found the respondent’s
family unit to be a cognizable group and explicitly noted that it encompassed
77
Of the eight unpublished immigration judge decisions post–L-E-A- collected for this
Article, three were grants of relief and five were referrals. There were no clear patterns in
decision-making that I could glean, nor is a set of eight decisions from eight different judges
a particularly good data set from which to draw any conclusions. As such, these decisions
are not analyzed as a whole, but are instead described throughout this Article as applicable.
78
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 596 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (finding that the
Board “summarily concluded” the case involved a valid particular social group “without
explaining how the facts supported this finding or satisfied the particularity and social
visibility requirements”).
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his aunt, uncle, cousins, and siblings.79 However, in that case the respondent
and his siblings had moved in with his aunt’s family at the age of seven after
his mother relocated to the United States, so it could be argued that his aunt’s
family had effectively become his nuclear family. In one of the other cases,
the Board and the immigration judge took no issue with the social group
defined as the respondent’s family, which included extended family
members.80 In a third unpublished decision, the Board accepted the
cognizability of the particular social group “relatives of persons who testified
and are/were prosecution witnesses against transnational criminal groups,”
where the “defining family member” was the respondent’s cousin.81 The
Board cited to past precedent “acknowledging the Board’s definition of a
legally cognizable particular social group”82 and indicated without further
discussion that the social group in this case was cognizable. Again, this
perfunctory recognition of cognizability will likely not be so widespread in
future decisions involving family-based claims given Barr’s recent critique
of such a “cursory treatment” in Matter of L-E-A-.83
2. Cognizability and nexus continue to be conflated
Although the Board stated in L-E-A- that the cognizability of the
particular social group and nexus should not be conflated,84 the Board made just
this conflation in a decision less than one month after L-E-A- was issued. The
Board considered the case of a Honduran respondent who had been threatened
and assaulted by his father, a gang member, who wanted him to join the gang as
well as to turn over to the gang a house that had been left to the respondent.85
The Board concluded that, “[w]hile an immediate family is typically recognized
as a cognizable particular social group under the Act, the facts in this particular
case do not support a finding that the respondent has met his burden that he is a
member of a cognizable social group” because only he and one other member of
the group, identified as nuclear family members of his father, were targeted.86

79

H-G-N-, A XXX XXX 536, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2019) (on file with the IRAC).
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 19905, (B.I.A. undated but post–
L-E-A-).
81
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 25459, 4 (B.I.A. July 26, 2017).
82
Id.
83
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596.
84
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 43 (B.I.A. 2017) (citing Matter of W-G-R-,
26 I.&N. Dec. 208, 218 (B.I.A. 2014)).
85
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 16808, 2-3 (B.I.A. June 16,
2017).
86
Id.
80
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The Board implied that the lack of evidence that the persecutor was
motivated by the family relationship in and of itself indicated that the group was
not cognizable. The Board noted, “[there is no external threat against the nuclear
family of X, the defining attribute of the respondent’s proposed social group is
his persecution by his own father, and the risk of persecution alone does not
create a particular social group.”87 This analysis conflates the question of the
cognizability of a particular social group with whether the persecution suffered
was on account of this group, which should be two separate inquiries. This case
appears to be an outlier since the Board separately analyzed the cognizability of
the particular social group and whether there was a nexus in the other ten
unpublished decisions consulted for this Section. Nevertheless, this decision
reflects the Board’s tendency to ignore that there should be separate inquiries
into whether a particular social group’s construction is permissible and whether
the persecutor was motivated by the applicant’s membership in the group.
3. Nexus is more likely to be found in Fourth Circuit cases
Six of the seven positive unpublished BIA decisions identified for this
Article arose in the Fourth Circuit, where the precedent is much more
favorable.88 The Fourth Circuit has warned in family-based cases against an
“excessively narrow interpretation” of the nexus standard that focuses on the
immediate cause of the persecution rather than the bigger picture.89 In the Fourth
Circuit, it appears that the “defining family member” need not have been targeted
on account of a protected ground, and the Court is much less likely to find that
the persecutor was motivated by “personal reasons” rather than membership in
the particular social group consisting of the applicant’s family.90
For example, in Cruz v. Sessions, the Honduran respondent had
considered going to the police after her common law husband was killed by
a member of an organized crime group. She asserted a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of her membership in the group: “nuclear family
members of Johnny Martinez.”91 The immigration judge concluded that the
“main reason” that the respondent had been threatened was to convince her
not to go to the police and the Board adopted this conclusion, adding “[h]arm
meted out by a private actor for personal reasons or solely on general levels
87

Id. at 2.
In fact, the Board acknowledged in L-E-A- that the case may have been decided differently
in the Fourth Circuit. L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 46 n.3.
89
Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Mar. 14, 2017).
90
See id. at 130 (criticizing the BIA’s conclusion that the applicant was persecuted for
“personal reasons”).
91
Id. at 126.
88
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of crime and violence in Honduras” did not qualify for asylum or withholding
of removal.92 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit held “that the BIA and IJ applied
an improper and excessively narrow interpretation of the evidence relevant
to the statutory nexus requirement.”93 The Court explained that it was a
“shortsighted[]” approach to only consider the persecutor’s stated objective
of preventing the petitioner from reporting him to the police when the very
reason that she had investigated her husband’s disappearance was their family
relationship.94 The Court did not even speak to the motivations of the
persecutor in harming the respondent’s husband, demonstrating the
irrelevance of nexus for the “defining family member” in the Fourth Circuit.
Similarly, in Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, in which the Honduran
petitioner’s family store was targeted for extortion by gang members, the
Fourth Circuit determined that “the IJ and BIA erred by focusing narrowly
on the ‘immediate trigger’ for MS-13’s assaults—greed or revenge—at the
expense of Salgado-Sosa’s relationship to his stepfather and family, which
were the very relationships that prompted the asserted persecution.”95 The
Court further criticized the Board for improperly focusing on whether the
“defining family member” was persecuted on account of a protected
ground, reiterating that this is not a requirement for asylum eligibility.96
Given the similarities in facts to L-E-A-, also a case involving extortion of
a family business, the Fourth Circuit’s differing conclusion here is
particularly striking.
Since L-E-A-, the Board has cited to these decisions (and others in
the same vein)97 to remand cases arising in the Fourth Circuit, where it has
been foreclosed from applying its otherwise largely restrictive
interpretation of the nexus standard. In Matter of C-O-M-, a case involving
a wife who was targeted after her husband resisted extortion by gang
members, the Board wrote, “[t]his case arises within the jurisdiction of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which has cautioned
this Board against applying an excessively narrow interpretation of the
nexus requirement in cases involving particular social groups defined by

92

Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 129.
94
Id.
95
Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 458 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing to Oliva v. Lynch, 807
F.3d 53, 60 (4th Cir. 2015)).
96
Id. at 458-59.
97
See generally Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2017) (reversing the
BIA’s determination that petitioner did not show persecution due to a familial relationship);
cf. Velasquez v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 188, 196 (4th Cir. 2017) (finding that a custody dispute
between relatives did not satisfy nexus).
93
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family identity.”98 In another decision, Matter of H-G-N-, the Board found
nexus where a man was threatened after his aunt did not pay extortion and
concluded, “[t]he critical assessment under Fourth Circuit precedent is
whether the familial reason is why the applicant, rather than another
person, was targeted.”99 Per a straightforward reading of the statutory
language around nexus, it seems that this should be the key question for
all cases of family-based persecution regardless of the circuit in which
they arise.100 The fact that the Board distinguished the Fourth Circuit from
others in this way further indicates the Board’s proclivity for finding no
nexus in family-based claims when not limited by federal court precedent.
Aside from the Fourth Circuit, there has been limited circuit court
jurisprudence on family-based asylum claims since the Board’s decision in
L-E-A-. The circuits appear to have largely proceeded with the same posture
they previously held, with the Seventh Circuit going so far as to explicitly
note that, “L-E-A- did not establish a new rule. As the government agreed at
oral argument, L-E-A- applied the same analysis that the Board has followed
since at least 2007.”101 The majority of circuits continue to recognize familybased groups as cognizable, but tend to find on the facts that a non-protected
reason was what motivated the persecution.102 This appears to be a particularly
98

C-O-M-, A XXX XXX 428, 2 (B.I.A. June 22, 2018) (on file with the IRAC); see also PR-R-, A XXX XXX 272, 2 (B.I.A. Feb. 22, 2019) (on file with the IRAC) (describing the
Fourth Circuit as having found the Board to be “shortsighted” in its analysis of nexus in Cruz
v. Sessions); K-A-A-P-, A XXX XXX 625, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 7, 2019) (on file with the IRAC)
(“The Fourth Circuit has found nexus to family relationship when the alien was threatened
as a result of or as revenge for the acts of a family member.”).
99
H-G-N-, A XXX XXX 536, 2 (B.I.A. Mar. 14, 2019) (on file with the IRAC).
100
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2018) (“[T]he applicant must establish that [a protected
ground] was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”).
101
W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018).
102
See, e.g., Lopez v. Barr, 773 Fed. App’x 459, 462 (10th Cir. 2019) (reasoning that the
nexus did not exist where the applicant was threatened for helping her sister escape abuse,
because the persecutor would have threatened anyone who had helped her sister regardless
of whether they were related); Diaz-Rivas v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 769 Fed. App’x 748, 755
(11th Cir. 2019) (deferring to the BIA’s determination that the gang targeted the petitioner
for reporting her brother-in-law’s disappearance rather than because of their family
relationship); Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding insufficient
evidence that the attacks on the applicant’s family were due to family status rather than
widespread criminality); Ruiz-Escobar v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 2018)
(finding that petitioner failed to establish nexus following a break-in because he did not know
who the persecutors were looking for or why); Revencu v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 396, 405 (5th
Cir. 2018), as revised (Aug. 2, 2018) (holding that the persecution of the applicant’s wife did
not establish asylum eligibility where he was not also targeted); Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d
537, 542 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding the record did not sufficiently show that petitioner’s family
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popular viewpoint in cases involving extortion where the alternative perception
of the persecutor’s motivation as purely pecuniary has frequently prevailed.103
By reaching this conclusion, the circuits have continued to avoid the need to
squarely address the question of whether the “defining family member” need
have been persecuted on account of a protected ground.
D. Matter of L-E-A- as Decided by the Attorney General
In December 2018, Acting Attorney General Whitaker certified
Matter of L-E-A- to himself, staying the Board’s decision and requesting
briefing on the question: “Whether, and under what circumstances, an alien
may establish persecution on account of membership in a ‘particular social
group’ . . . based on the alien’s membership in a family unit.”104
Previewing the Attorney General’s posture, DHS argued
emphatically in its February 2019 brief not only against finding nexus in
claims involving family-based targeting, but also against the heretofore
largely unchallenged cognizability of particular social groups defined by

membership was the reason for her persecution rather than her status as a witness to her
brother’s murder); Quero-Quero v. Sessions, 740 F. App’x 140, 140 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing
to L-E-A- and denying the petition for review because there was insufficient nexus between
petitioner’s family membership and the persecution); Alvarez v. Sessions, 739 F. App’x
372, 375 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding without factual discussion that there was insufficient
nexus between petitioner’s familial relationships and his feared harm); Maravilla v. Sessions,
695 F. App’x 179, 180 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that petitioner failed to prove that her family
membership was “at least one central reason” she was targeted for extortion).
103
See, e.g., Cruz-Guzman v. Barr, 920 F.3d 1033, 1037 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Cruz’s evidence
does not show that 18th Street’s actions were motivated by a particular animus toward the
Cruz-Guzman family itself, as opposed to an ordinary criminal desire for financial gain.”);
Cruz v. Att’y Gen., 746 F. App’x 869, 872 (11th Cir. 2018) (“[S]ubstantial evidence supports
the BIA and IJ’s conclusion that the threat Orozco’s aunt levied against Orozco was
motivated by a personal dispute, namely, money . . . . ”); Betancourt-Aplicano v. Sessions,
747 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2018) (“[W]here threats made against a family member are
simply ‘a means to achieve the [robbers’] objective to increase [their] profits,’ there is no
nexus.” (quoting Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 46-47 (B.I.A. 2017)));
Macias-Padilla v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 541, 543 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he record indicates
the cartel was criminally motivated to obtain money.”); Sanchez v. Sessions, 706 F. App’x
897, 899 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A]ny persecution or fear of future persecution was not because
of Ramirez’s membership in a particular social group, but rather because of the criminals’
desire to rob the hotel for which her husband worked.”); Center for Gender & Refugee
Studies Database Case No. 28588, (B.I.A. July 16, 2018) (“The respondent left El Salvador
because of a fear of criminal violence and extortion by gang members, conditions which are
widespread in El Salvador. However, individuals who are fleeing general conditions of
violence in a country do not qualify for asylum or withholding of removal under the Act.”).
104
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 584 (Att’y Gen. 2018).
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family.105 This stance represented a complete about-face from the
Department’s position in its 2016 brief in L-E-A- that “[o]rdinarily, in many,
if not most societies, an ‘immediate family’ unit . . . will qualify as a
cognizable particular social group.”106 In contrast, in its 2019 brief, the
Department asserted, “excluding such family relationship-based protection
claims would not be inconsistent with U.S. obligations under the 1967
Protocol . . . . ”107 The Department in its 2019 brief further urged the Attorney
General to find that “protection claims purportedly based on membership in
a family unit will ordinarily fail to satisfy the all-important nexus
requirement.”108 To justify this position, the Department asserted that most
persecutors harm their victims not because of their family membership but on
account of “personal disputes,” which are not a protected ground.109 The
Department listed out common scenarios that implicate family-based targeting,
including issues between families; intrafamilial conflicts; domestic violence;
punishment or retaliation; and threats arising from extortion,110 concluding that
in each of these scenarios, a “personal dispute” rather than family membership
is likely to have motivated the persecution.111 The Department was silent as to
the question of whether the “defining family member” need demonstrate nexus,
as if this issue were irrelevant given the improbability of finding that the
persecutor targeted the victim due to a family relationship.
On July 29, 2019, Attorney General Barr issued his decision, overruling
the Board’s recognition of the respondent’s particular social group as
cognizable and asserting that most families––including nuclear families––fail
the social distinction test and therefore will not qualify as particular social
groups.112 Barr did not comment on nexus, except to indicate that he was not
overruling that portion of the Board’s decision.113 The Board’s finding that the
respondent’s persecutors were motivated by financial gain, rather than a
protected ground,114 remains undisturbed. Taking a cue from Matter of A-B-,115
105

See generally Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Supplemental Brief, Matter of L-E-A, Respondent,
27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017) [hereinafter DHS 2019 Brief].
106
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 1.
107
DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 2.
108
Id. at 31.
109
See id. at 27 (labeling one section as “Claims for Protection Are Unsuccessful When
Arising from Personal Disputes and Portrayed as Membership in a Family Unit-Based
Particular Social Group”).
110
Id. at 29-32.
111
Id. at 32.
112
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 581.
113
Id. at 597.
114
L-E-A- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 46-47.
115
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 588-89 (citing to Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 33336 (Att’y Gen. 2018)).
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Barr’s decision turned on the critique that the Board improperly relied on the
parties’ agreement on the cognizability of the respondent’s particular social
group rather than engaging in a detailed factual analysis.116 Alongside this
narrow holding, Barr also took the opportunity to include far-reaching dicta
about family-based particular social groups more generally. He argued that
cases finding families to be a particular social group should not be followed if
they were decided prior to M-E-V-G- and W-G-R- in 2014 when the Board
clarified the particularity and social distinction requirements.117 He also
maintained that many of the decisions following 2014 that accepted groups
defined by family should be given no weight because they failed to adequately
assess particularity and social distinction118 or “relied upon outdated dicta from
the Board’s early cases.”119
Having summarily dismissed the decades of Board and circuit case
law recognizing the cognizability of family-based particular social groups,
Barr devoted a paragraph to underscoring his authority as Attorney General
to interpret immigration law.120 He then proceeded to assert an interpretation
of family-based particular social group membership that requires applicants
to demonstrate that their specific families are well-known and distinct in
some way in their societies.121 For over a decade prior to 2019, USCIS
instructed its asylum officers that “[t]he question here is not whether a
specific family is well-known or visible in the society. Rather, the question
is whether that society views the degree of relationship shared by group
members as so significant that the society distinguishes groups of people
based on that type of relationship.”122 In contrast, under Barr’s interpretation
in Matter of L-E-A-, adjudicators must “focus on the particular social group
as it is defined by the applicant and ask whether that group is distinct in the
society in question . . . . It is not sufficient to observe that the applicant’s
society (or societies in general) place great significance on the concept of
the family.”123 The Attorney General concluded that most families would
not be able to meet this standard124 and found that the respondent in L-E-Afailed to establish a cognizable particular social group because he “did not
116

Id. at 584, 586.
Id. at 588-90.
118
Id. At 589.
119
Id. At 590-91.
120
Id. at 591-92.
121
Id. at 594.
122
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE,
ELIGIBILITY PART III: NEXUS 33 (2009) https://www.aila.org/infonet/aobt-lesson-nexus-five
-protected-characteristics [https://perma.cc/DRK7-9U23].
123
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 594.
124
Id. at 594.
117
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show that anyone, other than perhaps the cartel, viewed the respondent’s
family to be distinct in Mexican society.”125
On September 30, 2019, USCIS published guidance “in accordance
with Matter of L-E-A-” directing USCIS employees to “no longer recognize
family-based particular social groups based only on the general significance of
family relationships in the society in question” but to require that the specific
family be well-known or essentially famous in the society.126 The guidance also
notes that “[o]fficers should be alert that . . . the Attorney General predicted that
the average or ordinary family typically will not meet the standard, because it
will not have the kind of identifying characteristics that render a specific family
socially distinct within the society in question.”127 USCIS also amended its
Asylum Division Officer Training Course on credible fear and torture
determinations to quote heavily from L-E-A- with similar instructions.128
Given the recency of the Attorney General’s decision, there has been
limited jurisprudence since on cases involving family relationships.
However, attorneys around the country have reported receiving negative
determinations in cases of family-based targeting that seemingly would have
been granted prior to L-E-A-. In November 2019, the Catholic Legal
Immigration Network (CLINIC) brought a lawsuit challenging the new
USCIS guidance on behalf of thirteen plaintiffs who were subjected to
expedited removal orders following application of this new guidance.129
The plaintiffs are all individuals who would most likely have been found
to have a credible or reasonable fear130 prior to Barr’s 2019 decision,
125

Id. at 592.
USCIS L-E-A- GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 3.
127
Id. at 7.
128
See generally U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER
TRAINING COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS
(2019), https://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-updates-officer-training-credible-fear [https://per
ma.cc/E4RM-MMBJ].
129
S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18.
130
Individuals subject to Expedited Removal or who enter at a port-of-entry must demonstrate
that they have a credible fear, meaning that they have a “significant possibility” of establishing
eligibility for asylum or protection under the Convention Against Torture. Individuals who
have a prior order of removal against them or who have certain criminal convictions must
demonstrate a “reasonable possibility” they would be persecuted on account of a protected
ground or would be subject to torture. Credible and Reasonable Fear determinations are beyond
the scope of this Article, but more information can be found from U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, e.g. Questions & Answers: Credible Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questionsanswers-credible-fear-screening [https://perma.cc/9NWD-LSQD] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020);
Questions & Answers: Reasonable Fear Screenings, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMGR. SERVS.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/questions-answers-reasonable
-fear-screenings [https://perma.cc/FYY4-3XL7] (last visited Mar. 12, 2020).
126
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including a four-year-old boy who was threatened because his father
refused to join a political campaign.131 The father was found to have a
reasonable fear on account of his political opinion.132 Under prior
precedent, the boy would have satisfied even the most stringent of
interpretations of asylum law on family-based targeting: the “defining
family member” was persecuted on account of a protected ground, the family
relationship was nuclear, and, given his very young age, there were no other
reasonable explanations for the threats against the boy besides his family
membership. The case of this plaintiff, and the others included in the suit,
clearly demonstrates the marked shift in the way that some adjudicators
are now analyzing protection claims that involve targeting of family
members. The complaint details how almost all of the plaintiffs were
subject to negative determinations because the officers found that they had
not satisfied the social distinction requirement.133
In contrast, it appears that at least some immigration judges have
continued to grant cases based on family. For example, an Omaha
immigration judge granted withholding of removal in a September 2019 case,
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 27115, finding that
the respondent had been persecuted on account of her membership in the
particular social group of female members of her family.134 Although the
judge liberally referenced the 2019 L-E-A- opinion in other parts of the
decision, it is notably absent in the section discussing social distinction. The
court cited only to Matter of M-E-V-G-, but did seem to be implicitly
incorporating Barr’s more stringent social distinction test, noting that “the
[redacted surname] family as a whole is meaningfully distinguished” within
the society in question because the family was known to be involved in drug
and human trafficking.135 In another September 2019 case, Center for Gender
& Refugee Studies Database Case No. 34658, a Baltimore immigration judge
relied heavily on the positive Fourth Circuit precedent discussed infra, finding
131

S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18, ¶¶ 18, 19, 24; Press Release, Crowell Moring LLP,
CLINIC Lawsuit Seeks to Protect Asylum Seekers who Fear Family-Based Harm (Nov. 25,
2019), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/PressReleasesAnnouncements/CLINIC-Law
suit-Seeks-to-Protect-Asylum-Seekers-who-Fear-Family-Based-Harm/pdf [https://perma.cc/
M9JQ-WS2M].
132
S.A.P. Complaint, supra note 18, ¶ 24.
133
Id. at ¶¶ 24–35; In fact, representatives from the San Francisco Asylum Office stated in a
presentation on October 22, 2019 that families effectively have to be “Kennedys” or
“Kardashians” in order to satisfy the social distinction requirement. San Francisco Asylum
Office, Presentation to the U.C. Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic (Oct. 22, 2019).
134
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 27115, 13 (Immigration J. Dec.
Sept. 27, 2019).
135
Id. at 11.
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the respondent’s proposed particular social groups of “family members of
[respondent’s uncle]” and “family members of [respondent’s sister]” to be
cognizable.136 The court cited to L-E-A- as standing for the proposition that
while family is “not inherently a cognizable particular social group, family
may still constitute a particular social group . . . .”137 The court then went on to
accept as sufficient evidence of social distinction the fact that the persecutor
stated on multiple occasions that he knew the respondent’s entire family and
that the respondent was from a small community where all of the neighbors
know each other.138 Given that similar facts are likely to be present in many
family-based targeting cases, it appears that this judge correctly parsed the
holding and dicta from Barr’s decision to reject as binding the portion opining
that most nuclear families will not meet the social distinction requirement.
At the circuit level, the courts have had mixed reactions to the
Attorney General’s opinion in L-E-A-. For example, in October 2019, the
Fifth Circuit characterized the decision quite differently from the USCIS
guidance, stating that “Matter of L-E-A stands for the proposition that
families may qualify as social groups, but the decision must be reached on a
case-by-case basis.”139 The court also “recognize[d] that Matter of L-E-A- is
at odds with the precedent of several circuits.”140 The Eleventh Circuit in an
August 2019 case remanded the petitioner’s asylum and withholding of
removal claims, finding that his relationship to his father-in-law was “one
central reason, if not the central reason” for his persecution by a Mexican
cartel.141 Because the petition for review only dealt with nexus and not with
the cognizability of the particular social group—“his father-in-law’s
immediate family,” which the Board and the immigration judge had accepted
prior to the Attorney General’s decision—the Court “express[ed] no view on
how, if at all, Matter of L-E-A- impacts Mr. Perez-Sanchez’s proposed PSG
or whether the Attorney General’s decision is entitled to deference.”142 In
contrast, the Tenth Circuit in a September 2019 decision framed L-E-A- in
much the same way that USCIS has, emphasizing that nuclear families will
generally not be socially distinct.143 However, the court declined to reach this
issue directly, upholding the determination of the immigration judge and the

136
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 34658, 17 (Immigration J. Dec.
Sept. 2019).
137
Id. at 18.
138
Id. at 18.
139
Pena Oseguera v. Barr, 936 F.3d 249, 251 (5th Cir. 2019).
140
Id. at 251.
141
Perez-Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 935 F.3d 1148, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2019).
142
Id. at 1158, n.7 (emphasis added).
143
Saucedo-Miranda v. Barr, 758 Fed. App’x 586 (10th Cir. 2019).
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Board of Immigration Appeals that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate
nexus because his family was simply the victim of criminal activity.144
Adjudicators at all levels are still grappling with Barr’s decision in
L-E-A-, although it has already done serious damage to prior decades of legal
precedent recognizing the validity of claims involving family relationships.
However, as was the case with domestic violence and gang cases following
A-B-,145 Matter of L-E-A- should not be seen as foreclosing family-based
asylum. In fact, Barr acknowledged that his “opinion does not bar all familybased social groups from qualifying for asylum”146 and emphasized that the
determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.147 Despite USCIS’s
guidance to the contrary, the holding of L-E-A- is not that particular social
groups defined by family are categorically impermissible. Instead, it is the
much narrower holding that the Board’s analysis of the cognizability of the
respondent’s proposed social group “did not . . . satisfy the Board’s duty to
ensure that the respondent satisfied the statutory requirements to qualify for
asylum” and thus that the Board’s conclusion that the particular social group
was valid should be reversed.148 The remainder of the decision, including
Barr’s sweeping statements about previous case law, and his new
interpretation of social distinction, is dicta that need not be followed.
Furthermore, the Attorney General’s more restrictive positions on familybased asylum represent a significant departure from prior precedent,

144

Id. at 7.
See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 126 (D.D.C. 2018) (finding that the blanket
rule in Matter of A-B- against domestic violence and gang-related particular social groups
was impermissible as both arbitrary and capricious with no legal basis and running contrary
to the individualized analysis required by the INA).
146
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 595 (Att’y Gen. 2018). He was likely
motivated to take this position by a District Court Judge’s rebuke of his predecessor in Grace
v. Whitaker, which challenged Attorney General Sessions’s seemingly categorical rejection
of domestic violence and gang-related particular social groups in Matter of A-B-. See Grace,
344 F. Supp. 3d at 126.
147
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 591; see also Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“[T]he BIA may not reject a group solely because it had previously found a
similar group in a different society to lack social distinction or particularity.”); Matter
of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 251 (B.I.A. 2014) (“Social group determinations are
made on a case-by-case basis.”); Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A.
1985) (“The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains ‘to be determined on a case-by-case basis.’”); U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMGR. SERVS., PM-02-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE FEAR,
CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF AB- 3 (2018) (“Officers must analyze each case on its own merits in the context of the
society where the claim arises.”).
148
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 596.
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making them even less deserving of judicial consideration.149 For all of
these reasons, it is clear that the Attorney General lacks the authority to
make a blanket ruling that a specific particular social group is not cognizable,
leaving room for practitioners to present family-based claims while taking
additional care to build the record for their individual clients.
E. International and Comparative Views on Family-Based Particular Social
Groups and Nexus
Having examined the history of particular social groups defined by
family membership in the United States, this Article now turns to consider the
same subject beyond our borders. Per the United States Supreme Court, “[i]f one
thing is clear from the legislative history of the . . . definition of ‘refugee,’ and
indeed the entire 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance with the 1967
United Nations Protocol . . . .”150 As such, guidance from the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), while not binding, is considered
persuasive and “may be a useful interpretive aid.”151 The UNHCR has published
149

In National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X Internet Services,
the Supreme Court held that where Chevron deference was owed to the agency on an
issue, but a federal court published an opinion on the issue before the agency did, the
court must defer to the agency’s subsequent published interpretation. 545 U.S. 967, 980
(2005). However, given the decades of preceding Board case law supporting the
cognizability of family-based particular social groups, this change could potentially be
challenged as representing an unreasoned and arbitrary departure from the agency’s
preceding position that does not merit deference by the courts. See id.. at 1001 (“[T]he
Commission is free within the limits of reasoned interpretation to change course if it
adequately justifies the change.”); Smiley v. Citibank (S. Dakota), 517 U.S. 735, 742
(1996) (indicating that “[s]udden and unexplained change” or “change that does not take
account of legitimate reliance on prior interpretation” may be arbitrary, capricious, or
an abuse of discretion not requiring deference); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421, 446 n.30 (1987) (“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts
with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than
a consistently held agency view.”).
150
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37 & n.19 (1987) (citing H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 96-781,
at 19 (1980)). The United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees in 1968. The 1967 Protocol is effectively identical to the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees, but expands its scope beyond events that occurred in Europe before
January 1, 1951. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S. 267. The fundamental concept behind both the Convention and the Protocol is the
principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits countries from returning individuals to return
to a country where they would be subjected to persecution.
151
I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 427 (1999); see also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S.
511, 536-37 (2009) (citing the U.N. handbook as a source “to which the Court has looked for
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multiple guidelines and position papers to aid states parties in assessing
protection claims.
The UNHCR has recognized that the family constitutes a cognizable
particular social group since “[m]embers of a family, whether through blood
ties or through marriage and attendant kinship ties, meet the requirements of
the definition by sharing a common characteristic which is innate and
unchangeable, as well as fundamental and protected.”152 The UNHCR in
another document called the family “[o]ne of the most visible examples of a
particular social group” and further provided that nexus can be established
“for example where family members . . . are targeted for persecution as a
means of punishing the [“defining family member”] or forcing them to
surrender or cease their activities.”153 The UNHCR has indicated that family
membership could be a viable way of analyzing asylum claims based on
gender-based violence154 as well as gang violence.155 The recognition of
families as a social group is further reinforced by other sources of
international law such as the American Convention on Human Rights, to
which the U.S. is a signatory, which describes the family as “the natural and
fundamental group unit of society,”156 and the Universal Declaration of
guidance in the past”); Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 248 (B.I.A. 2014)
(confirming that, while not binding on U.S. authorities, the views of the UNHCR “are a useful
interpretive aid”).
152
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, POSITION ON CLAIMS FOR REFUGEE STATUS
UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES BASED ON A FEAR OF
PERSECUTION DUE TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S MEMBERSHIP OF A FAMILY OR CLAN ENGAGED IN A
BLOOD FEUD ¶ 18 (2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/44201a574.html [https://perma.
cc/6LEH-JWA4].
153
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE STATUS DETERMINATION: IDENTIFYING
WHO IS A REFUGEE, SELF-STUDY MODULE 2, at 37 (2005), https://www.unhcr.org/publi
cations/legal/43144dc52/self-study-module-2-refugee-status-determination-identifyingrefugee .html [https://perma.cc/A3WQ-YQGF].
154
See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION: GENDER-RELATED PERSECUTION WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF
THE 1951 CONVENTION AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶
33 (2002), https://www.unhcr.org/3d58ddef4.pdf [https://perma.cc/86AM-UV7Z] (explaining
that women are frequently persecuted because of the political opinions and activities of their
male relatives, and these family connections must be taken into account when considering
gender-based claims).
155
See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS ¶ 40 (2010), https://www.ref
world.org/pdfid/4bb21fa02.pdf [https://perma.cc/PNT9-XFQV] (explaining that relatives of
individuals targeted by gang members can be persecuted because of their family ties, and in
such a case, family membership would constitute a particular social group).
156
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 17(1), Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
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Human Rights, recognizing that “[t]he family is the natural and fundamental
group unit of society and is entitled to protection by Society and the State.”157
In addition to considering the viewpoints of international bodies, the
United States Supreme Court has indicated that the interpretations of other
treaty signatories should be given considerable weight.158 It is thus instructive
to examine the jurisprudence of other common law countries159 that have
considered the grounds for refugee protection on the basis of family.
1. United Kingdom—family is a cognizable particular social group
and “defining family member” need not establish nexus
The United Kingdom House of Lords160 issued its seminal decision
around family-based particular social groups in 2006. In Secretary of State
for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department,161 the House of Lords considered two different cases, the first
of which implicated family-based particular social group membership
wherein an Iranian woman and her son faced persecution after her husband
was arrested and detained by the Revolutionary Guards.

157
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 16(3) (Dec. 10, 1948); see
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 23(1) (Dec. 19, 1966), S. TREATY
DOC. NO. 95-20, 999 UNTS 171 (containing the same language); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10(1) (Dec. 16. 1966), S. TREATY DOC. NO. 95-19;
993 UNTS 3 (identifying the family as “the natural and fundamental group unit of society”).
158
See Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (“In interpreting any treaty, the opinions of our
sister signatories . . . are entitled to considerable weight” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
159
As noted by the UNHCR, “In civil law jurisdictions, the particular social group ground is
generally less well developed. Most decision-makers place more emphasis on whether or not a risk
of persecution exists than on the standard for defining a particular social group.” U.N. HIGH COMM’R
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: “MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP” WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF ARTICLE 1A(2) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION
AND/OR ITS 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶ 8 (2002), https://www.
unhcr.org/en-us/publications/legal/3d58de2da/guide lines-international-protection-2-membershipparticular-social-group.html [https://perma.cc/V9KS-XXPQ].
160
The House of Lords was the United Kingdom’s highest Court of Appeal until 2009, when
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom was created. See generally HOUSE OF LORDS,
HOUSE OF LORDS BRIEFING: JUDICIAL WORK (2008), https://www.parliament.uk/documents/
lords-information-office/hoflbpjudicial.pdf [https://perma.cc/C496-TV5T]. The judicial work
was done by twelve Law Lords, who became the first justices of the UK Supreme Court. See
generally id. When the House of Lords retained jurisdiction over judicial matters, the procedure
was for each of the Law Lords on the Appellate Committee (usually five Law Lords) to give
their opinions in the order of seniority. See generally id.
161
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. K [2006] UKHL 46, [2007] 1 AC 412 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (UK).
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The Law Lords were unequivocal that a family can constitute a particular
social group. Lord Bingham of Cornhill noted that the Secretary of State (the
party opposing the appellant’s claim) accepted that family could be a particular
social group and stated that this “reflects a consensus very clearly established by
earlier domestic authority . . . and also by international authority. The consensus
is clearly reflected in the academic literature.”162 Both Lord Hope of
Craighead163 and Lord Rodger of Earlsferry concurred, with the latter stating, “it
is obvious that a family can constitute a ‘particular social group’. Indeed, the
family could well be regarded as the archetypal social group.”164
Having established that family is a cognizable particular social group,
the Committee focused more on the question of whether the “defining family
member” must have been persecuted on account of a protected ground. The
Lords considered two 1997 Court of Appeal cases that reached opposite
conclusions on the question,165 and determined that the Refugee Convention
“directs attention to the position of the asylum-seeker, not to that of any other
person with whom he or she may be associated. It is his or her fear of persecution
for a Convention reason, not someone else’s fear, that is in issue.”166 Lord Hope
emphasized that to require nexus to a protected ground for the “defining family
member” would impermissibly require more of family-based claims than of
others.167 He wrote that what is critical is the connection between the protected
ground and the persecution but that clearly, “it is not necessary to show that
everyone else of the same race, for example, or every other member of the

162

Id. at [19] (citing to Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Savchenkov [1996] Imm AR
28, [1995] EWCA Civ 47 (UK); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v.
Sarrazola [2001] FCA 263 28–34 (Austl.); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th
Cir. 2005); JAMES HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 164–66 (1st ed. 1991); GUY
GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (2d ed. 1996)).
163
Id. at [45] (citing to U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, POSITION ON CLAIMS FOR
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES
BASED ON A FEAR OF PERSECUTION DUE TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S MEMBERSHIP OF A FAMILY OR
CLAN ENGAGED IN A BLOOD FEUD 5 (2006), https://www.refworld.org/docid/44201
a574.html [https://perma.cc/6LEH-JWA4]; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supra note 157, art. 23(1).
164
Id. at [61].
165
Compare Quijano v. Sec’y of State for the Home Department [1996] EWCA Civ 1244 (U.K.)
(“[T]he fact that the stepfather was not entitled to claim asylum demonstrated that the family
was not a social group liable to persecution because it was a particular social group.”), with R v.
Immigration Appeal Tribunal, Ex parte De Melo, [1997] Imm. AR 43, 49 (U.K.) (“The original
evil which gives rise to persecution against an individual is one thing; if it is then transferred so
that a family is persecuted, on the face of it that will come within the Convention.”).
166
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. K and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
[2006] UKHL 46 at [48].
167
Id. at [47].
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particular social group, is subject to the same threat.”168 Lord Rodger pointed
out that to require animus against the family itself would render family-based
claims virtually impossible to win.169 Lord Bingham reiterated the doctrine of
mixed motives, noting “[t]he ground on which the claimant relies need not be
the only or even the primary reason for the apprehended persecution. It is
enough that the ground relied on is an effective reason.”170
This unanimous decision by the five Law Lords established binding
precedent in the United Kingdom that the “defining family member” need not
have been persecuted on account of a protected ground, laying the
groundwork for subsequent decisions to this effect in lower courts, as well as
other jurisdictions that have cited approvingly to the case. Furthermore, the
U.K. jurisprudence seems much less focused on whether a persecutor’s
motives in family-based cases can be instead characterized as based on
personal or criminal reasons. For example, a judge from the Upper Tribunal,
Immigration and Asylum Chamber considered a case in 2012 involving an
Albanian blood feud but made no indication that the persecutor’s motivations
may not have been connected to a protected ground,171 a stark contrast to the
Department of Homeland Security’s 2019 brief in L-E-A- that specifically
identified blood feuds as failing to meet the standard for nexus because they are
“based on personal disputes and involve criminal acts of personal retribution.”172
2. New Zealand—family is a cognizable particular social group and
“defining family member” need not establish nexus
The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority173 has explicitly
cited to and adopted the reasoning in Secretary of State for the Home
168

Id.
Id. at [64].
170
Id. at [17].
171
See EH v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2012] UKUT 00348 (IAC) [61]-[62] (U.K.)
(citing to Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department and noting “[i]t is settled therefore, that members of families or
clans are capable of constituting a particular social group and that the Refugee Convention
would be engaged where there existed a reasonable degree of likelihood that members of a
particular family would be at risk of serious harm on return . . . .”); see also AN and NN v.
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t [2007] UKAIT 97 [21] (U.K.) (discussing whether an
actual risk of harm existed while noting that the existence of a blood feud affecting the
petitioners’ family was uncontested).
172
DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 29.
173
The New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority was established in 1991 to adjudicate
appeals from the Refugee Status Branch of the New Zealand Immigration Service. The
Authority was replaced by the Immigration and Protection Tribunal in 2010. New Zealand:
169

Vol. 5:3]

Family Fleeing: Family Membership as a Basis for Asylum

33

Department v K and Fornah v Secretary of State for the Home Department.174
In a 2010 case, the Colombian appellant had been threatened by paramilitary
groups for refusing to alter land records for them and had fled with her husband
and son, who also applied for protection. In defining the term “particular social
group,” the Authority embraced the “fundamental or immutable” test initially set
out by the United States in Acosta but notably made no mention of the
particularity or social distinction requirements added later.175 The Authority
found “uncontroversial” the proposition that membership of a family can
constitute a particular social group, citing to a number of preceding New
Zealander cases as well as case law from the United Kingdom, Australia, the
United States, and international law secondary sources.176 On the issue of nexus,
the Authority held, “although it is clear that the primary family member (the
wife) does not face a risk of being persecuted for a Convention reason, the sole
reason for the risk faced by the husband and the child is their membership of the
wife’s family.”177 The Authority granted Convention protection to the husband
and child and, in contrast to much of the U.S. jurisprudence, did not see fit to
even discuss whether the reason for the persecution was family-based targeting
or a generalized criminal intent on the part of the paramilitary.
The Immigration and Protection Tribunal of New Zealand continues to
apply this same reasoning in cases involving family-based persecution to date.
For example, in 2012, the Tribunal considered the case of a South African man
and his family who had been threatened by a criminal group because of the man’s
successful business.178 The Tribunal found that the man was not eligible for
protection because he did not face persecution on account of a Convention
ground but “for reasons of crime.”179 The Tribunal noted “it can also be said of
Immigration and Protection Tribunal, REFWORLD, https://www.refworld.org/publisher/NZIPT.html [https://perma.cc/Y9DH-V4B9] (last updated Mar. 27, 2020, 5:14 PM).
174
Refugee Appeal Nos 76485, 76486, 76487 [2010] NZRSAA 71 at [81]-[83] (N.Z.) New
Zealand is not the only foreign jurisdiction that followed the UK House of Lord’s decision
in Secretary of State for the Home Department v. K and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the
Home Department. The High Court of Ireland has also done the same. See, e.g., AVB v.
Refugee Appeals Tribunal [2015] IEHC 13 [27] (Ir.) (“It seems to me that the tribunal
member fell into error of law in finding that feuds among family members did not have a
convention nexus . . . .”) .
175
Id. at [97].
176
Id. at [79]-[80] (citing Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Savchenkov [1995] EWCA
Civ 47 (U.K.); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola [2001] FCA
263 ¶¶ 28-34 (Austl.); Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1188 (9th Cir. 2005); JAMES
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 164-66 (1st ed. 1991); GUY GOODWINGILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 361 (2d ed. 1996), among other sources).
177
Id. [83].
178
AK (South Africa) [2012] NZIPT 800174-176 (N.Z.).
179
Id. at [66].
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the mother and daughter that they, too, are at risk because of crime” but
ultimately concluded, “[t]hey are also at risk, however, for another reason . . .
because they are members of the father’s family.”180 As in this case, New
Zealand adjudicators as a whole appear to be more willing than their counterparts
in the U.S. to extend protection to applicants even when the persecutors acted in
part out of non-Convention grounds181 and give no consideration to whether the
“defining family member” can demonstrate nexus.182
3. Australia—family is a cognizable particular social group but
“defining family member” must demonstrate nexus
The Federal Court of Australia183 in 2000 considered the case of a
husband and wife from Colombia in Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs (No 3).184 After the wife’s brother was killed by a
criminal group for failing to pay a debt, members of the same group
demanded that she pay the money or they would kill her children.185 The
applicant asserted a fear of persecution based on her family membership. The
Federal Court found “no obstacle to viewing the usual family as a ‘particular
social group,’”186 and held that the “defining family member” need not have
been persecuted on account of a protected ground.187

180

Id. at [67].
See, e.g., AC (Colombia) [2012] NZIPT 800279 at [50] (N.Z.) (finding the appellant
eligible for protection because a “contributing reason” he was at risk was his relationship to
his older brother who had been killed by gangs even though he was “substantially” targeted
for recruitment); see also FK (Sri Lanka) [2019] NZIPT 801383 at [69] (N.Z.) (citing to a
Refugee Status Appeals Authority decision holding that protection was warranted since, as long
as family membership is a contributing cause, “It is not necessary for that cause to be the sole
cause, main cause, direct cause, indirect cause or ‘but for’ cause. It is enough that a Convention
ground can be identified as being relevant to the cause of the risk of being persecuted”).
182
See, e.g., CM (Bangladesh) [2019] NZIPT 801411 at [91, 93] (N.Z.) (finding that the
appellant, a successful businessman in a dispute with former colleagues, had not
demonstrated nexus but that his wife was entitled to protection on account of her membership
in the particular social group consisting of her husband’s family members).
183
The Federal Court of Australia has appellate jurisdiction from the Federal Circuit Court
of Australia, which in turn reviews decisions made by the Minister for Immigration and
Border Protection and the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The Court’s Jurisdiction, FED.
CT. OF AUSTL. https://www.fedcourt.gov.au/about/jurisdiction [https://perma.cc/9GP2-67
22] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
184
Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [No. 3] [2000] FCA 919
(Austl.).
185
Id. ¶¶ 5–8.
186
Id. ¶ 33.
187
Id. ¶ 36.
181
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However, reacting to this decision,188 the Australian Parliament in
2001 passed the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6), adding
subsection 91S, which states that persecution must be disregarded if the
“defining family member” was not persecuted on account of a Convention
reason.189 The Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs explained,
“[t]he convention was not designed to protect people who fear persecution
for personal reasons that have little or nothing to do with the convention - for
example, because they have failed to pay their family’s debts.”190 This
legislation was introduced and first read on August 28, 2001 in the midst of the
so-called Tampa crisis, during which the Australian government refused to
grant permission to a boat carrying 433 rescued refugees to enter its waters.191
In applying Section 91S, the Australian Courts have since denied
family-based asylum cases where the “defining family member” was not
persecuted on account of a protected ground. Given this requirement,
Australian adjudicators often need not even reach the issue of whether the
applicant’s persecution was motivated by the family relationship versus
personal reasons or generalized criminal intent. Illustrating how 91S operates
in practice, in 2006, the High Court of Australia192 considered the case of an
Albanian appellant who feared persecution due to a blood feud deriving from
when his grandfather killed a member of another family. The Court dismissed
the appeal, holding that, “it is clear that the grandfather had a fear of persecution
188

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No 6) 2001
indicated that the amendment was aimed at addressing the Sarrazola holding to prevent its
future application. STCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs [2006] HCA 61, ¶ 17 (Austl.).
189
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 91S (Austl.).
190
STCB, [2006] HCA ¶ 18 (quoting the Second Reading Speech of the Minister for
Immigration and Cultural Affairs).
191
The Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) was first introduced and read in the
House of Representatives on August 28, 2001 and was assented to on September 27, 2001.
Migration Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 6) 2001 (Cth) (Austl.). https://parlinfo.aph.
gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22legislation%2Fbillhome%2F
r1391%22 [https://perma.cc/H6KW-MLQK]. The bill was passed on September 26, along
with a number of other of bills significantly curtailing the rights of migrants seeking asylum,
collectively known as the “Pacific Solution.” Parliament of Australia, Border Protection: A New
Regime, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Former_Commit
tees/maritimeincident/report/c01 [https://perma.cc/RVW2-GK9Y]. Among other things, the
Pacific Solution allowed for asylum-seekers to be processed offshore in places like Nauru and
Papua New Guinea. See, e.g., Refugee Council of Australia, OFFSHORE PROCESSING,
https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/offshore-processing/ [https://perma.cc/JPT4-R8RJ] (last
visited July 17, 2019).
192
The High Court of Australia is the final court of appeal and has broad authority to exercise both
original and appellate jurisdiction. About the AAT, AUSTL: ADMIN. APPEALS TRIBUNAL,
https://www.aat.gov.au/about-the-aat [https://perma.cc/4YC5-A4N6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
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for a reason other than those mentioned in . . . the Convention––revenge for
murder. Section 91S(a) requires that fear of persecution [as to the appellant] to
be disregarded.”193 The Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia194 adjudicated a
similar case in 2013, finding the family-based particular social group to be
cognizable and stating that “the essential and significant reason for the wellfounded fear of persecution is the applicant’s membership of this particular
social group.”195 However, in light of section 91S, since the “defining family
member” was targeted for “revenge . . . purely criminal in motive, not for any
Convention reason,”196 the applicant was not eligible for protection.
4. Canada—family is a cognizable particular social group but
“defining family member” must demonstrate nexus
Canadian law has also settled in the same place as Australia, albeit
without legislative action. It is well-accepted in Canada that family, not
limited to just nuclear families, can constitute a particular social group.197
However, despite an earlier line of cases indicating that the “defining family
member” need not have been persecuted on account of a protected ground,198
more recent jurisprudence in Canada has fallen squarely into the opposite camp.
193

TCB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006]
HCA 61, ¶ 24 (Austl.).
194
The Refugee Review Tribunal of Australia provided final review of decisions by officers
of the Department of Immigration and Citizenship denying protection visas to non-citizens.
In 2015, the Tribunal was amalgamated into the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, which
provides merits review of a wide range of administrative decisions. Its decisions are subject
to review by the Federal Court of Australia and the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.
195
1217750 [2013] RTTA ¶ 82, ¶ 78 (Austl.).
196
Id. ¶ 80.
197
See, e.g., Estrada v. Canada (Ministry of Citizenship & Immigration), [2015] F.C. 1019,
para. 8 (Can.) (“[M]embership in a family may take the place of membership in
a particular social group for the purposes of a refugee claim.”); Hercules Santos v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2011] F.C. 644, para. 23 (Can.) (accepting the
applicant’s extended family as a particular social group); Ndegwa v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship & Immigration), [2006] F.C. 847, para. 9 (Can.) (“That the family is a valid
social group for the purposes of seeking refugee protection is well established.”); Serrano v.
Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999] F.C.J. 570, para. 30 (Can.) (“It is
common ground that a family may be a ‘particular social group.’”).
198
See, e.g., Rojas v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1995] F.C.J. 296,
para. 2 (Can.) (stating that family membership is “a ground of persecution which stands on
its own and need not be related to another of the grounds recognized by the Convention”);
see also Hristova v. Canada (Minister of Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. No.
132, para. 31 (Can.) (“It would seem that immediate family can be seen to fit within the
definition of ‘particular social group.’”); Al-Busaidy v. Canada (Minister of Employment &
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In 2000, the Federal Court of Canada – Appeal Division199 heard the
case of a Ukrainian businessman who reported government corruption. After
the entire family received threats and suffered retaliation, his son applied for
protection based on membership in the particular social group of their
family.200 The court of first instance, the Immigration and Refugee Board,
found that because the businessman had not been persecuted on account of a
protected ground, his son did not meet the requirements for refugee
status.201 On appeal, the Trial Division upheld the Board’s decision “in
concluding that when the primary victim of persecution does not come
within the Convention refugee definition, any derivative Convention
refugee claim based on family group cannot be sustained. Otherwise, the
anomaly of derivative claims being allowed but primary claims being
denied could result.”202 The Federal Court declined to rule on this issue
since it decided the case on other grounds.203
There is a growing consensus among Canadian adjudicators204 around
the principle that it would be an impermissible anomaly for the “defining
Immigration), [1992] F.C.J. 26, para. 3 (Can.) (“Accordingly the [Refugee] Board has
committed reviewable error in not giving due effect to the applicant’s uncontradicted
evidence with respect to his membership in a particular social group, namely, his own
immediate family.” (internal footnote omitted)); cf. Velasquez v. Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. 4777, para. 5 (Can.) (declining to return an
applicant who had not suffered persecution to her home country because her husband
undisputedly had suffered persecution).
199
From 1971 to 2003, the Federal Court of Canada consisted of the Trial division and the Appeal
Division. In 2003, the Trial Division continued on as the Federal Court and the Appeal Division
became the Federal Court of Appeals. History, FED. CT.| COUR FÉDÉRALE, https://www.fct-cf.
gc.ca/en/pages/about-the-court/history [ttps://perma.cc/8MWG-GHH6] (last visited Mar. 18, 2020).
200
Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C. 327, paras. 6–7 (Can.).
201
Id. at para. 12.
202
Id at para. 16.
203
Id. at para. 38.
204
See, e.g., X, Re, [2018] R.A.D.D. No. 293, ¶ 23 (Can.) (“[W]hen the primary victim
does not come within the definition of ‘Convention refugee,’ any derivative claims based
on family group cannot be sustained.”); Acevedo Beza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship
& Immigration), [2006] F.C. 478, para. 32 (Can.) (“Because [the applicants] did not prove
that . . . the principal claimant before the Board . . . met the definition of Convention
refugee, their related application cannot be granted, since there is no nexus with the
persecution grounds.”); Serrano v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1999]
F.C.J. 570, para. 42 166 (Can.) (“I do not accept that family connection is an attribute
requiring Convention protection, in the absence of an underlying Convention ground for the
claimed persecution.”). Canadian applicants have met with much more success when they
can demonstrate that the “defining family member” was persecuted on account of a protected
ground. See, e.g., Hercules Santos v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration),
[2011] F.C. 644, para. 33 (Can.) (finding reviewable error where the defining family member
had been persecuted on account of her political opinion).
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family member” not to be eligible while his family members are afforded
protection.205 For example, in 2002, the Trial Division ruled that a
Guatemalan applicant who had been kidnapped to extort a ransom from her
parents, who were successful restaurant owners, had not been persecuted on
account of a Convention ground and was thus not eligible for protection.206
The Judge concluded,
This . . . also avoids the anomaly that Ms. Gonzalez’s parents,
as the victims of crime, cannot claim the protection of the
Convention, but Ms. Gonzalez could, solely because of the
relationship with her parents. It avoids the further anomaly
that Ms. Gonzalez cannot claim status as a Convention refugee
on the basis of her ordeal as a kidnap victim, but could do so
as the daughter of the recipient of the ransom demand.207
As one Federal Court Judge observed in a 2015 decision, “The family,
as a group, must therefore be subjected to retaliation and revenge to hope to
be granted the protection of Canada.”208 However, this position may be
somewhat mitigated by the fact that the Canadian courts apply a less
restrictive standard for nexus in requiring that the Convention ground be a
reason, but not necessarily the central or sole reason, for the persecution.209
II. FAMILY-BASED PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP
MEMBERSHIP IN PRACTICE
The second half of this Article transitions from describing the existing
state of the law to surfacing the lessons it yields for practitioners handling familybased cases going forward. Given Barr’s recent ruling in Matter of L-E-Achallenging social group cognizability and the Board’s previous denial of the
205
It is not clear from the case law why the “defining family member” not being eligible for
protection should justify barring their family members from protection. If so troubled by this
“anomaly,” it would be equally defensible for the Court to consider whether there are
grounds for extending protection to the “defining family member,” rather than taking it away
from applicants who otherwise meet the Refugee definition.
206
Gonzalez v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2002] F.C.J. 456,
paras. 3, 15 (Can.).
207
Id. at para. 17.
208
Estrada v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2015] F.C. 1019, para. 10 (Can.).
209
See, e.g., Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. B344, [2013] F.C. 447,
para. 40 (Can.) (“[I]f at least one of the motives can be related to a Convention ground, nexus
may be established.”); Shahiraj v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2001]
F.C.J. No. 734, para. 20 (Can.) (finding nexus where the applicant was targeted “based at
least partially on his own association with his brother”); Zhu v. Canada (Minister of
Employment & Immigration), [1994] F.C.J. 80, para. 2 (Can.) (“[I]t is enough for the
existence of political motivation that one of the motives was political.”).
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case based on nexus, it is all the more important that asylum applicants submit
detailed evidence as well as explicit arguments as to how they meet both of these
requirements.210 Furthermore, as noted in the Introduction, in light of the Board’s
2018 ruling that applicants must delineate all particular social group formulations
before the Immigration Judge or lose them on appeal,211 practitioners should
consider and assert all possible viable legal theories for their clients.
A family-based particular social group may be possible under a diverse
set of circumstances. One category particularly germane in the present day is
cases involving gang violence. Many of the recent asylum seekers fleeing
Central America and Mexico report that they left their countries to escape gangs
and other organized criminal groups.212 While a family-based theory of
targeting will of course not apply to all cases, it may be feasible in many given
that members of armed groups frequently target family members of individuals
who oppose them.213 This opposition may take many forms including resisting
extortion,214 testifying as a witness to crimes committed by gangs,215
threatening to report or in fact reporting criminal activity,216 turning down
attempts at recruitment,217 rejecting sexual advances,218 being a member of a
rival gang,219 or defecting from a gang.220 Although the person who engages in
210

This Article focuses on cognizability and nexus for particular social group claims. The
other statutory requirements for a grant of asylum are outside the scope of this article, but
of course should also be carefully analyzed and supported by evidence.
211
Matter of W-Y-C- & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 189, 191 (B.I.A. 2018).
212
See, e.g., Robbie Whelan, Why Are People Fleeing Central America? A New Breed of
Gangs is Taking Over, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pay-ordie-extortion-economy-drives-latin-americas-murder-crisis-1541167619
[https://perma.cc/Z9HZ-7EUK] (discussing how gang violence is driving migration away
from Central America).
213
U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS, supra note 155, at ¶¶ 17, 40.
214
See generally Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451 (4th Cir. 2018); ZavaletaPoliciano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2017); Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, 757 F.3d 9
(1st Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 8, 2014); Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec.
40, 41 (B.I.A. 2017).
215
See, e.g., Rivas v. Sessions, 899 F.3d 537 (8th Cir. 2018); Crespin-Valladares v. Holder,
632 F.3d 117 (4th Cir. 2011).
216
See, e.g., Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122 (4th Cir. 2017), as amended (Mar. 14, 2017);
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2015); Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944
(4th Cir. 2015).
217
See, e.g., Hernandez-Avalos, 784 F.3d 944; Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332 (4th Cir.
2014); Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2012); Bonilla-Morales v. Holder,
607 F.3d 1132 (6th Cir. 2010).
218
See, e.g., Gonzalez Ruano v. Barr, 922 F.3d 346, 349-50, 357 (7th Cir. 2019).
219
See, e.g., Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015); Cordova, 759 F.3d 332.
220
See, e.g., W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018).
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these activities may be found not to satisfy nexus to a protected ground,221 their
family members may have winning claims, especially with the submission of
strong evidence and a clearly-articulated legal theory.
Family-based particular social groups could also be workable in cases
involving intrafamilial violence. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit in AguirreCervantes v. INS considered the case of a young Mexican woman who had
suffered extreme abuse by her father, who also beat her siblings and her
mother.222 The Court held the petitioner had been persecuted on account of
her membership in the particular social group consisting of her immediate
family because, “Mr. Aguirre’s goal was to dominate and persecute members
of his immediate family . . . . There is no evidence that he ever acted violently
toward any non-family member . . . . It was established by abundant
evidence––and undisputed––that it was the petitioner’s status as a member of
that family that prompted her beatings.”223
Similarly, a Philadelphia immigration judge issued a grant of asylum
in 2018 to a Mexican woman and her children who had experienced years of
abuse from the woman’s husband. The judge found the particular social group
of “immediate family members of [name of husband]” to be cognizable224
and concluded that although the persecutor may have held mixed motives,
221

See, e.g., Matter of S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 589-90 (B.I.A. 2008) (holding that gang
recruitment resisters do not constitute a particular social group); Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 91, 593-94 (B.I.A. 2008) (same); Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 221-23
(B.I.A. 2014) (finding that former gang members do not constitute a particular social group).
However, some of these characteristics have been found by certain courts to be cognizable
particular social groups. For example, claims involving witnesses, persons who testify
against gang members, and persons who assist law enforcement have met with some success.
See, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013); Madrigal v.
Holder, 716 F.3d 499, 502 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that a former military official who
participated in anti-drug enforcement might have a meritorious particular social group
claim); Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 504 (3d Cir. 2011), as amended (2012) (finding
“a ‘common, immutable characteristic’ with other civilian witnesses who have the ‘shared
past experience’ of assisting law enforcement against violent gangs”). But see In re C-A-, 23
I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006) (finding that government informants, unlike public
witnesses, do not constitute a particular social group for purposes of designation as refugees).
Though beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that applications in these
categories have been granted, especially with the submission of a robust record. The Center
for Gender & Refugee Studies, for example, has tracked outcomes and does have grants in
many of these areas. See Technical Assistance and Training, supra note 20.
222
Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169, 1172 (9th Cir. 2001), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated, 270 F.3d 794 (9th Cir. 2001), withdrawn from bound volume, and opinion
vacated on reh’g en banc, 273 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001). The decision was vacated and
superseded because the persecutor in the case, the petitioner’s father, died.
223
Id. at 1178.
224
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 17509, 12 (Immigration J.
Dec. Oct. 11, 2018).
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one central reason for his actions was to dominate and control the immediate
family members whom he saw as property.225 The court went on to point out
that the persecutor would not have harmed his wife and children “were one
to remove the characteristic of ‘kinship tie’ from the equation,” and that this
was clear evidence that family membership was central to the persecution.226
These cases notwithstanding, fact patterns involving intrafamilial
violence may be especially prone to the conclusion that the persecutor was
not motivated by the victim’s social group membership. In fact, the
Department of Homeland Security commented on this very matter in its 2016
brief, indicating that intrafamilial harm will often be for “purely personal
reasons,” but acknowledging as well that all cases must be assessed on their
individual record.227 By 2019, the Department had taken a harder line,
dismissing domestic violence cases as unlikely to satisfy the requirements for
persecution on account of family membership.228
A. Arguing Cognizability of a Family-Based Particular Social Group
As presented in the first half of this Article, the majority of
adjudicators––with Attorney General Barr in the distinct minority229––have
accepted the cognizability of family-based particular social groups when they
involve nuclear family members.230 As such, when possible, respondents
should articulate their social groups as “immediate/nuclear members of the
[surname] family” or “immediate/nuclear family members of [name of
defining family member].”
As an illustration of the importance of how social groups are
formulated: the Board considered a case in June 2017 in which the
respondent defined his particular social group as “nuclear family members
of X, his father and a leader of a local MS-13 clique.”231 The Board found
this formulation lacked social distinction, focusing on the additional terms
appended to the core “nuclear family members of X.”232 The Board stated
that the group was not socially distinct because there was insufficient
225

Id.
Id.
227
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 17 n.10.
228
See DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 1 (“[A]n abusive spouse inflicts harm on his or
her spouse because of their personal relationship, but that fact alone does not suffice to
demonstrate nexus between the harm and membership in their family unit.”).
229
See Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 494 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (noting that
some nuclear families are socially distinct and can be considered “particular social groups”).
230
See supra Section I.
231
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 16808 1 (B.I.A. June 16, 2017).
232
Id. at 2.
226
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evidence to show that children or family members of gang leaders are
viewed or treated distinctly in Honduran society.233 The Board failed to
appreciate that the phrase “the leader of a local MS-13 clique,”234 is merely
a descriptor of individual X and thus does not substantively alter the
formulation of the group. Had the respondent described his social group
simply as “nuclear family members of X,” it seems like there may have
been a different outcome––or at least a substantially different analysis.
Further elucidating the importance of carefully delineating the particular
social group, the Department of Homeland Security, in its 2019 brief in LE-A-, argued the particular social group of the respondent’s family should
be rejected because it lacked particularity.235 It seems evident that the
respondent meant “nuclear family” given that the “defining family
member” was his father, but the Department appeared to be willfully ignoring
this and considered only the more general group of “his family” because the
respondent did not explicitly say otherwise.236 In light of these cases and
others, practitioners should avoid overcomplicating their social groups by
including additional terms and characteristics, but also should take care to
specify “nuclear family” or “immediate family” where appropriate.
Attorney General Barr has asserted that the family should generally not
be recognized as a cognizable social group, but it is well-established that social
groups must be assessed on a case-by-case basis.237 Rather than assuming that
any given formulation will automatically succeed (or fail) on cognizability,
practitioners should make explicit arguments and submit evidence238 to this
effect.239 It will be even more important to do this when presenting a social group
that extends beyond the bounds of immediate family membership in light of the
significant disagreement among adjudicators as to the cognizability of extended
family-defined groups. In these cases, practitioners should consider asserting
multiple alternative formulations of social groups, forcing the immigration judge
to separately analyze their merits and to preserve them on appeal. The following
Subsections present arguments that can be made along with types of evidence to
support them to demonstrate that family-based particular social groups meet the
requirements for cognizability.

233

Id.
Id. at 1.
235
DHS 2019 Brief, supra note 105, at 38.
236
Id.
237
Compare L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, with supra notes 112, 147 and accompanying text.
238
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (B.I.A. 2014) (listing “country conditions
reports, expert witness testimony, and press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies,
historical animosities and the like” as relevant to establishing a social group).
239
But see supra note 21 (arguing that the Board should return to solely using the Acosta standard).
234
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1. Acosta – fundamental or immutable
The first requirement for particular social groups to be found cognizable
is that characteristics of the group be either fundamental or immutable, as set out
in Matter of Acosta.240 This test is relatively easy for family-based groups to
satisfy, and even Attorney General Barr conceded that “many family
relationships will be immutable” in L-E-A-.241 Family membership is an
immutable characteristic because people generally cannot change the family
to which they belong. Children will always have their same parents. Brothers
and sisters will always be siblings. Eccentric aunts, uncles, and cousins can
be avoided at family gatherings but not entirely denied. Family also falls into
the “fundamental” category envisioned by Acosta. Even in cases where
family membership could arguably be changed, such as joining another
family by marriage, as described in the Department’s 2016 brief in L-E-A-,
[E]ven where it may be possible to leave an immediate family
group in such a way that one can no longer be considered to
have the trait, this type of family relationship is generally
fundamental to an individual’s identity, and is not a change
that one should be required to make.242
Family bonds, whether immediate or extended, are so intrinsic to an
individual’s identity that they should not have to be severed or hidden.
2. Particularity
In order to be found cognizable, particular social groups must also
be defined with particularity. Nuclear families satisfy this requirement
because they have clear, definable boundaries comprised of a person’s
parents, spouse, siblings, and children.243 Oftentimes, it is clear who is a
member of a nuclear family because they share a surname and may
cohabitate. Even when individuals in a family have different surnames––
for example, when a wife and husband do not share a surname or where a
daughter has taken on a new surname and moved into another home after
marriage––persecutors and members of a given community may still
identify them as part of the same family. Most adjudicators, including the
240

Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 593.
242
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 7-8; see also Matter of Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233
(identifying kinship as an innate characteristic that satisfies the immutable requirement).
243
In fact, this position was taken by the Department of Homeland Security in its 2016 brief.
The Department cited to the Merriam-Webster definition of “immediate family” as support.
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 1 n.1.
241
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Attorney General in L-E-A-,244 accept that nuclear families can satisfy the
particularity requirement.
Some adjudicators, however, have rejected family-based social
groups as lacking sufficient particularity where the family relationship was
more attenuated. In Matter of S-E-G-, the Board found that “[t]he proposed
group of ‘family members,’ which could include fathers, mothers, siblings,
uncles, aunts, nieces, nephews, grandparents, cousins, and others, is also too
amorphous a category.”245 This is not to say, however, that no social group
that includes extended families can be particular.246 The Fourth Circuit in
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder found cognizable the social group “family
members of those who actively oppose gangs in El Salvador by agreeing to
be prosecutorial witnesses” where the petitioner’s uncle was the “defining
family member.”247 The court stated, “[t]he family unit—centered here
around the relationship between an uncle and his nephew—possesses
boundaries that are at least as ‘particular and well-defined’ as other groups
whose members have qualified for asylum.”248 In a 2018 decision, the
Seventh Circuit seemed to accept that the petitioner was part of a cognizable
social group consisting of his family where the “defining family member”
was his cousin.249 The Ninth Circuit has also indicated that it might find
particular social groups involving extended family members cognizable.250
In order to satisfy the particularity requirement, practitioners may cite
to positive case law but should also create an individual record clearly
demonstrating that the proposed social group has definable boundaries. A
social group such as family of X person or members of the X family could
encompass extended family members so long as the evidence supports that,
within the given community or society, this group is sufficiently particular.
244
See L-E-A- II, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 593-94 (citing other cases to point out that an extended
family definition might be “too vague” to be particular before continuing to argue that even
clearly defined family groups must also be socially distinct).
245
In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 585 (B.I.A. 2008); see also Center for Gender &
Refugee Studies Database Case No. 20641, 17 (Immigration J. Dec. May 2018) (finding that
that the particular social group of “[name] family” lacked particularity because “there are a
large number of individuals who may qualify as a member of this family”);
246
See supra Subsection I.C.1 (describing how the BIA has found particular social groups
that include extended family members cognizable following L-E-A-).
247
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 120-21 (4th Cir. 2011).
248
Id. at 125; see also Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 338, 340 (4th Cir. 2014) (remanding
a case to the BIA to consider whether the petitioner’s kinship ties to his uncle and cousin
constituted a cognizable social group).
249
See Plaza-Ramirez v. Sessions, 908 F.3d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 2018) (denying petition for
review on other grounds, nonetheless).
250
Rios v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 1123, 1128 (9th Cir. 2015) (remanding for consideration of a
particular social group that included the petitioner’s cousin).
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As an illustration, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic had a client who was
from a small village in El Salvador. Multiple members of his family had been
killed or threatened by gangs, including uncles, aunts, and cousins.251 We
argued that, in the context of the community in question, the extended family
constituted a discrete family unit with definable boundaries that could satisfy
the particularity requirement. We included as evidence statements from the
applicant and his family members such as, “[f]amilies in our village and
nearby villages know one another. Because there are only about 200 houses
in village, we mostly know who everybody is,”252 and “[m]y family and I are
well-known within our village and the neighboring village. Because our village
is small, and because my family has lived there for a long time, most people
know and can easily recognize my family.”253 Alongside these types of
statements, we also submitted country conditions documentation demonstrating
that the concept of family is broader than just nuclear family in El Salvador. For
example, the Family Code obligates grandparents, siblings, uncles and aunts,
and first cousins to provide for minors in their families.254
3. Social distinction
The final requirement for cognizability is social distinction. There is
ample evidence demonstrating that families are viewed as distinct in most
societies. Many countries have laws, policies, and customs that recognize
family units.255 In fact, the very existence of family-based immigration in the
251

Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic,
granted asylum Apr. 14, 2017.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
See Código de Familia, Decreto No. 677, Book 4, Title II, Ch. 2, § 1, art. 287 (Oct. 11,
1993), http://www.oas.org/dil/esp/Codigo_de_Familia_El_Salvador.pdf [https://perma.cc/
6LHU-SK9D] (allowing a judge to name as a child’s guardian the child’s grandparents,
siblings, uncles and aunts, or first cousins).
255
For example, in Matter of L-E-A-, the Department argued against the cognizability of the
respondent’s particular social group because he had not submitted evidence that “this
paternal relationship between two male individuals is perceived” to be distinct. DHS 2019
Brief, supra note 105, at 39. It would have been relatively easy to submit evidence that the
father-son relationship is viewed distinctly in Mexican society. See generally ALFONSO
SEPÚLVEDA GARCÍA & HABIB DÍAZ NORIEGA, FAMILY LAW IN MEXICO: OVERVIEW (2014)
(discussing the laws that set out parental rights and obligations in Mexico); Kimberly
Updegraff et al., Exploring Mothers’ and Fathers’ Relationships with Sons Versus
Daughters: Links to Adolescent Adjustment in Mexican Immigrant Families, 60 SEX ROLES
559 (2009) (exploring the differences in how Mexican mothers and fathers treat their sons
versus daughters). The respondent could also have submitted an expert affidavit on how
Mexican society views the relationship between a father and son or simply testified to this
on the record regarding his own experiences.
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U.S. reflects that this country views the family as significant in some way.
The Supreme Court has stated, “the Constitution protects the sanctity of the
family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this
Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate
and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral and cultural.”256 Of
course, the relevant inquiry is whether the society in question, not the United
States, views the group distinctly. Nevertheless, the fact that the United States
has a longstanding history of recognizing the family as the fundamental unit
of society should give immigration adjudicators some foundation to
understand how the same might be true in other countries.
As discussed previously, Attorney General Barr, in L-E-A-, sought
to establish a new standard for social distinction in cases involving a
family-based particular social group that would require the applicants to
demonstrate that their specific families are widely-recognized or wellknown in their societies.257 This position runs counter to the wellestablished rule that the proper question is whether nuclear or extended
families, as a general matter, are socially distinct in the relevant society.258
However, given the recent decision in L-E-A-, it is quite likely that this
erroneous line of reasoning may become increasingly common among
adjudicators. Practitioners may thus want to consider arguing that the
applicant’s family is in fact well-known or “famous” in some way in the
society in question, while at the same time pushing back on the position
that this is a requirement for social distinction.
For example, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic regularly submits
evidence demonstrating that our clients’ families are known as being
particularly religious, affluent, influential, or some other characteristic and
are therefore treated differently than others in the community. A recent client
testified that his was only one of four black families in his town, so they stood
out and faced widespread derision.259 Another client stated that his family
was well-known as being one of only a few that were Mormon amidst the

256

Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); see also Obergefell
v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594 (2015) (“Cicero . . . wrote, ‘The first bond of society is
marriage; next, children; and then the family.’”). The Court has also indicated that one of the
primary concerns of our immigration laws is to protect family unity. See, e.g., I.N.S. v.
Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 224 (1996) (“The fundamental purpose of [the 1957 amendment to the
INA] was to unite families.”).
257
See supra Section I.D.
258
See, e.g., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., supra note 122, at 33 (instructing asylum
officers to assess how the relevant society views the degree of relationship).
259
Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic,
granted asylum May 6, 2019.
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predominantly Catholic community.260 Oftentimes the same evidence that
supports particularity may also be relevant to social distinction. The client
referenced in the preceding section was able to argue that the fact that he was
from a small village where everyone knew his family was evidence of both
particularity and social distinction. Practitioners should emphasize in these
cases that the relevant “society” for the social distinction analysis is the
smaller community or town rather than the country as a whole. Matter of ME-V-G- acknowledges that social distinction can be analyzed as “an inquiry
into a more limited subset of the country’s society.”261
As with the particularity requirement, adjudicators may be more
hesitant to find social distinction for particular social groups that include
extended family members. However, the Department of Homeland Security
in 2016 acknowledged that, in some societies, “extended family groupings
may have greater social significance, such that they could meet the
requirement of social distinction.”262 USCIS stated the same in its 2009
training materials and instructed that “[a]sylum officers should carefully
analyze [social distinction] in light of the nature and degree of the family
group asserted and should pay close attention to country conditions evidence
about the relevant social attitudes toward family relationships.”263 Though
the 2009 materials have been superseded, the 2019 USCIS guidance on
family-based claims still acknowledges the standing requirement that country
conditions documentation and societal context be considered in each
individual case, stating that “[o]fficers must analyze each case on its
merits…each case requires a fact-specific analysis based on the evidence
presented by the applicant.”264 Regardless of whether the social group is
limited to nuclear family members or a more extended grouping, practitioners
should submit clear evidence of social distinction, such as laws and policies
in the country in question that recognize the family relationship in some
way,265 secondary sources speaking to the significance of family,266 affidavits
260
Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic,
granted asylum Apr. 14, 2017.
261
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 243 (B.I.A. 2014).
262
DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 9.
263
U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, supra note 122, at 33.
264
USCIS L-E-A- GUIDANCE, supra note 18, at 6.
265
See supra note 254 and accompanying text (noting that the Salvadoran Family Code
creates obligations for not just parents, but also grandparents, siblings, uncles and aunts, and
first cousins to provide for minors in their families).
266
For example, a 1995 country study on Honduras states:
The family is the fundamental social unit in Honduras . . . People
emphasize the trust, the assistance, and the solidarity that kin owe to one
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from experts to this same effect, and testimony from the applicant about how
families operate as distinct units with the society in question.267
B. Arguing Nexus in Family-Based Targeting Cases
Once the cognizability of a particular social group has been
established, as well as the fact that the applicant is indeed a member of the
group, practitioners must next turn to the issue of nexus. Although each case
must be examined on its individual record, respondents can maximize their
chances of success by demonstrating how their claims mirror existing case
law. The following subsections present pointers drawn from the Board’s
ruling in L-E-A-268 and other cases.
1. Posit a clear theory or theories of why the family was targeted
Applicants should try to explain why the family was targeted rather
than relying solely on the pattern of harm against family members. Of course,
as the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged, “[i]t is unrealistic to expect that a
gang would neatly explain in a note all the legally significant
reasons it is targeting someone.”269 An asylum applicant is not expected to
testify as to the exact motivations of her persecutors, but may rely on direct

another. Family loyalty is an ingrained and unquestioned virtue; from early
childhood, individuals learn that relatives are to be trusted and relied on,
whereas those outside the family are, implicitly at least, suspect. In all
areas of life and at every level of society, a person looks to family and kin
for both social identity and assistance.
HONDURAS: A COUNTRY STUDY, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION 8890 (Tim Merrill, ed., 1995).
267
For example, an applicant might comment on how everyone refers to children as “[name
of parent’s] son/daughter” and to women as “[name of husband’s] wife,” demonstrating how
people are defined by their families.
268
As previously noted, the Attorney General in L-E-A- left undisturbed the nexus-related
portion of the Board’s decision. Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 494, 597 (Att’y
Gen. 2018). Focusing instead on cognizability, the Attorney General’s decision includes
virtually no commentary about nexus.
269
Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2017); see also EspinosaCortez v. Att’y Gen., 607 F.3d 101, 109 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]t would be patently absurd to
expect an applicant . . . to produce . . . documentary evidence of a persecutor’s motives . . .
since persecutors are hardly likely to submit declarations explaining exactly what motivated
them to act.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft,
371 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that, “because it is difficult to prove
motive” for persecution, asylum applicants “need only provide some evidence of motive,
direct or circumstantial” (emphasis added)).
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or circumstantial evidence.270 However, in practice, where there is no theory
presented of why the family would have been targeted, it gives adjudicators
more leeway to instead conclude that the persecutor was motivated by
“personal reasons” or a generalized criminal intent.
For example, in Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, the First Circuit upheld the
Board’s denial of a Honduran woman whose family had suffered repeated
harm by gangs.271 The petitioner stated that she did not know why the gangs
targeted her family,272 and both the immigration judge and the Board made
particular note of this in concluding that she had not experienced harm on
account of a protected ground but had been the victim of “rampant crime”
and “pervasive societal violence.”273 The First Circuit noted that although the
petitioner argued that the pattern of harm against her family was sufficient
evidence of nexus, the record did not compel that conclusion.274 The court
distinguished the petitioner’s case from a number of Fourth Circuit decisions
where the petitioners gave clear explanations of why their families had been
targeted.275 Similarly, in an unpublished Board decision that followed L-E-A-,
270

See, e.g., Ndayshimiye v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 124, 131 (3d Cir 2009) (stating that
“[a]pplicants for asylum bear the burden of providing some evidence of [a motive based on
a statutorily protected ground], direct or circumstantial” (emphasis added) (internal
quotations omitted)); Bolanos-Hernandes v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1285 (9th Cir. 1984)
(stating that because refugees are rarely able to offer direct corroboration of specific
threats, the applicant’s own credible testimony is sufficient); Matter of J-B-N- S-M-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007) (holding that the burden of proof for the persecutor’s
motive may be met by testimonial evidence).
271
Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 74, 78 (1st Cir. 2018); see also RuizEscobar v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 252, 259-260 (1st Cir. 2018) (finding no nexus to family
where the petitioner acknowledged he did not know who his attackers were and had no
personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding harm to other family members);
Marin-Portillo v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 99, 102 (1st Cir. 2016) (finding no nexus where the
petitioner testified that he did not know why the persecutor wanted to kill him, and rejecting
the argument that the pattern of targeting the petitioner’s family meant that “the only logical
inference” was that family membership was the reason for the death threats).
272
Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d at 78.
273
Id. at 80-81.
274
The court implied that the record could have permitted a different conclusion than
that reached by the Board, it but noted that it is required to sustain the findings of the
Board unless the record “compels” a reasonable factfinder to find otherwise. Id. at 80
(citing Palma-Mazariegos v. Gonzales, 428 F.3d 30, 34 (1st Cir. 2005)).
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See Sosa-Perez v. Sessions, 884 F.3d at 82 n.3 (citing Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873
F.3d 241, 248-50 (4th Cir. 2017), in which the petitioner argued she was threatened because
her father had fled the country after refusing to pay extortion to gang members;
Cruz v. Sessions, 853 F.3d 122, 129 (4th Cir. 2017), in which the petitioner was targeted by
organized criminals after she began investigating the disappearance of the father of her
children; and Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 950 (4th Cir. 2015), in which the
petitioner was threatened by gang members after refusing to allow her son to join the gang).
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the Board dismissed the appeal where “[t]he respondent testified to many
deaths within her extended family, but was unable to provide any reasons or
even speculate as to the reasons for several of the deaths.”276 The Board
agreed with the Immigration Judge that the respondent had been targeted
“based on general criminality or attempts at extortion.”277
In order to minimize the likelihood that the adjudicator will conclude
that the applicant was not actually harmed due to the family relationship,
practitioners should present evidence of the persecutor’s motivation and
assert a reasonable theory––or theories––as to why the family might have
been targeted. This can be achieved through careful fact investigation
involving interviews with the client and other family members where
appropriate, as well as country conditions documentation and expert
affidavits on patterns of family-based targeting by specific persecutors in a
given country. As an illustration, the Refugee & Human Rights Clinic
represented a young woman who received gang threats, but initially came to us
not knowing why.278 She told us that her father had been beaten and her mother
raped by members of the same gang.279 There was a clear pattern of familybased targeting, but the client had no explanation of why her family had been
singled out. Clients may not be privy to all of the information that supports
their family-based claims.280 Interviewing and documenting facts from other
family members, including obtaining police reports and death certificates, may
make the difference between a grant or a denial. In this case, after interviewing
the client’s parents, we learned that they were being extorted, but our client
was unaware of this fact, because her parents did not want to worry her.281 The
276

Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 19905, 1 (B.I.A. undated but
post–L-E-A-).
277
Id. at 2.
278
Declaration of X, represented by the UC Hastings Refugee & Human Rights Clinic,
decision pending (on file with author).
279
Id.
280
This may be particularly true of children and young persons. In fact, the Asylum Officer
Basic Training Course Guidelines (AOBTC) recognize the importance of relying on
objective evidence to determine nexus in cases involving children, since minors often do not
fully grasp why they have been targeted:
A child’s inability to understand all of the circumstances surrounding his
or her flight creates difficulty in analyzing the nexus of the harm or fear of
harm to a protected ground. Officers must pay close attention to the
objective facts surrounding the child’s claim to determine if there is a
nexus regardless of the child’s ability to articulate one.
U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVICES, ASYLUM DIVISION, AOBTC GUIDELINES FOR
CHILDREN’S ASYLUM CLAIMS 53 (2009).
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Declarations of X and Y, parents of the client represented by the UC Hastings Refugee &
Human Rights Clinic, decision pending (on file with author).
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affidavits that this client’s parents submitted in her case were critical to
demonstrating that her persecution was tied to her family membership. We also
submitted country conditions documentation and obtained an affidavit from an
expert on the client’s home country speaking to the reasons that certain families
there may be singled out for persecution by gangs.
2. Emphasize that mixed motives are permissible
Claims become more complicated when applicants were also
persecuted for reasons that may not fall into a protected category, as well as
on account of their family membership. Despite the clear recognition in the
law that “mixed motives” are permissible, 282 adjudicators appear to be less
likely to grant such cases. As noted previously, in L-E-A-, the Board found
that the respondent was targeted by the gangs because they wanted him to
sell drugs rather than on account of his family membership.283 Similarly, in
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, the Board found that the respondent had not
been threatened because of his uncle’s cooperation with the investigation of
the death of his cousin, but so that he would not testify himself.284
In order to guard against these types of conclusions, practitioners
should consider affirmatively identifying nonprotected reasons for the
persecution that occur alongside the family-based targeting and emphasize
that the presence of these nonprotected reasons does not constitute
evidence of the absence of a protected reason.285 The First Circuit accepted
this proposition in Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, stating “we are aware of no
legal authority supporting the proposition that, if wealth is one reason for
the alleged persecution of a family member, a protected ground—such as
family membership—cannot be as well.”286 In the same case, the First
Circuit acknowledged that motivations can change over time, giving the
282

See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
Matter of L-E-A- (L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40, 46-47 (B.I.A. 2017).
284
Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 127 (4th Cir. 2011). The Fourth Circuit found
the Board had applied the incorrect standard in reviewing the Immigration Judge’s finding
on nexus and remanded, but did not weigh in on the substantive issue of whether the
petitioner had satisfied nexus.
285
See, e.g., Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 608 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[I]f there is a nexus between
the persecution and the membership in a particular social group, the simultaneous existence
of a personal dispute does not eliminate that nexus.”); Menghesha v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 142,
148 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[A]n IJ may not treat the presence of a nonpolitical motive as evidence
of the absence of a political motive.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grace v. Whitaker,
344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 131 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Aldana-Ramos and Qu to conclude that the
simultaneous existence of a personal dispute “does not preclude a positive credible fear
determination . . . so long as the one central reason for the persecution is a protected ground”).
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757 F.3d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 2014), as amended (Aug. 8, 2014).
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example of a local militia that initially targets a family because of their
wealth but then “pursue[s] them throughout the country in order to show
the local community that even its most prominent families are not immune
and that the militia’s rule must be respected.”287 There is ample
documentation that the gangs and cartels that operate in Mexico and
Central America do not countenance challenges to their authority.288
Practitioners could explore the theory that a family was initially targeted
for one reason, but that the motives of the persecutor changed over time
to a desire to augment their power in the community by making an
example of the family in question.
On the other hand, although mixed motives are permissible, it can
nevertheless be helpful to explicitly rule out other motivations the persecutors
might have held in order to leave the family-based theory as the most viable
contender. Again, since a persecutor will rarely state why he is harming
someone, it can be effective to engage in a “process of elimination” type of
analysis. For example, in cases where the applicants are children or spouses
with no access to money, it is harder to argue that they were persecuted for
their own wealth or as a direct target of extortion. Along these lines, in the
aforementioned Refugee & Human Rights Clinic case of a young person
whose parents were being extorted, the client had been threatened by the
gangs starting from the age of ten.289 The gang members never asked her
directly for money and it would not have been reasonable to think that she
would have been able to pay extortion herself since she was just a child.290
Because of the client’s youth, we were able to rule out pecuniary motives as
to the persecutors and underscore that she was targeted because of her family
relationship to her father, as a means to control or punish him, rather than for
any other reason. Indeed, the gang members only ever threatened to harm the
client immediately after asking her father for money.291
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Id. at 19.
According to the UNHCR Guidance Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of
Organized Gang,
Because respect and reputation play such an important role in gang culture,
members and entire gangs go to great lengths to establish and defend both.
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3. Identify temporal patterns in targeting
One piece of evidence that can be critical for family-based
persecution claims is the timing of targeting of the applicant as well as other
family members. The Seventh Circuit, in particular, has focused on this issue
in recent cases. In the August 2018 case W.G.A. v. Sessions, the Seventh
Circuit found substantial evidence did not support the Board’s conclusion that
there was no nexus,292 noting that the threats against the petitioner began just
two days after his brother left the gang, demonstrating that the family
relationship was what caused him to be targeted.293 In April 2019, the Seventh
Circuit found nexus in a case where a husband was targeted by a cartel
member who wanted to “possess” his wife, analogizing it to W.G.A. in that
“the timing of the persecution and statements made by the persecutors leave
no doubt that he was and remains a target because of his relationship with his
wife.”294 The Seventh Circuit is not alone in its interest in looking at temporal
patterns. In Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, the Fourth Circuit pointed out
that the petitioner had not been harmed prior to when her father—who was
the initial target for extortion—fled the country, but that the gangs began
threatening her immediately after he left.295 Reviewing the converse set of
facts, the Sixth Circuit, in Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, found no nexus where
the majority of the harms that the petitioner suffered from gang members
actually happened prior to their attempts to recruit her son.296
The timing of harms may be especially relevant as evidence of nexus
in cases where the persecutor demanded something of the applicant, and the
applicant complied, but the targeting continued. Illustrating this principle, in an
unpublished 2019 decision, the Board remanded a case in which the respondent
acquiesced to paying extortion to gang members, but continued to receive
threats from them, indicating that the underlying reason for the persecution
could not have been solely financially-motivated.297 The First Circuit, in
Aldana-Ramos v. Holder, similarly remanded to consider the petitioners’
argument that they could not have been targeted on account of their wealth
292

W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 966 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22, 2018).
Id.; see also Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Case No. 20037, 6
(Immigration J. Dec. July 14, 2017) (discussing a case arising in the Seventh Circuit granting
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her son refused their requests to join).
294
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Zavaleta-Policiano v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 241, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (“The timing of the
threats against Zavaleta-Policiano is key, as it indicates that MS–13 was following up on its
prior threat to target Barrientos’s family if he did not accede to the gang’s demands.”).
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Bonilla-Morales v. Holder, 607 F.3d 1132, 1137 (6th Cir. 2010).
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because they had paid their father’s kidnappers, exhausted all of their financial
resources, and still received threats.298 This logic is not restricted to extortion
cases. In Cruz v. Sessions, the Fourth Circuit pointed out that the persecutor
had continued to target the respondent and her children even after she promised
not to report his criminal activity.299 This pattern of harm evidenced that the
central underlying reason for the persecution was not the demands––in this case,
that the respondent stay silent about her husband’s murder––but the familial
relationship.300 These cases provide a meaningful distinction from L-E-A-, in
which the respondent refused to give in to the cartel’s request that he sell drugs
from his father’s store.301 Had he consented and had the threats continued, this
would clearly have rebutted the Board’s conclusion that the respondent was
targeted solely to increase the cartel’s profits.302
4. Connect to another protected ground
While adjudicators continue to disagree over whether the “defining
family member” must also establish nexus to a protected ground, it is
indisputable that it certainly strengthens an applicant’s claim. The Board
stated in L-E-A- that nexus is “often” established “in cases where the family
status is connected to another protected ground, particularly where there is a
political motive . . . that is intertwined with or underlies the dispute.”303
Similarly, in Rios v. Lynch, the Ninth Circuit indicated its belief that
“persecutors are more likely to identify individual family members as part of
a particular social group when familial ties are ‘linked to race, religion, or
political affiliation,’” though the court also acknowledged that this is not a
requirement for nexus.304 In Ayele v. Holder, the Seventh Circuit found that
the Immigration Judge and Board had erred in not considering whether she
faced persecution on account of her family membership, given her family’s
involvement in the opposition political party.305 And in Vumi v. Gonzales, the
Second Circuit remanded the case of a Congolese petitioner who had been
persecuted by members of the military, who suspected that her husband had
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been involved in the assassination of then-president Kabila.306 The court held
that the Board had not adequately considered the petitioner’s claims based on
both her membership in the particular social group of her husband’s family
members, as well as an imputed anti-Kabila political opinion.307
In order to maximize an applicant’s likelihood of success,
practitioners should ascertain if there is any possible way to argue that the
“defining family member” was targeted on account of protected ground.308
Under these circumstances, it may also be effective to argue this same
protected ground as imputed to the applicant,309 in addition to the familybased particular social group. It seems logical that someone whose family
member is exceptionally religious or known to be involved in a political party
may also be assumed by persecutors to fall into the same category.
5. Explain why other members of the family were not harmed
Where the persecutor harmed multiple members of the same family,
this lends support to the proposition that the persecution was on account of
the family relationship.310 On the flip side, adjudicators have consistently
considered the ability of other family members to continue living in their
country of origin unharmed as evidence that there was no connection between
the persecution the applicant suffered and family membership.311 The case law
306

Vumi, 502 F.3d at 154.
Id. at 159.
308
In doing so, it may be useful to apply some of the other tips in this section as to the
“defining family member” as well, e.g. emphasizing the permissibility of mixed motives,
ruling out non-protected grounds, and examining the timing of persecution.
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See, e.g., Ayele, 564 F.3d at 870 (“Every member of Ayele’s immediate family either is
in exile, has disappeared, has been imprisoned and tortured, or is under house arrest.”); see
also U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 155, at ¶ 20 (noting that harm to
other family members may constitute evidence of a well-founded fear of future persecution).
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members continue to reside in Mexico, and in the same region, without any known issues
with the cartel.”); Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485, 493 (5th Cir. 2015) (finding the
fact that other family members remained in Honduras and have not faced persecution as
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clearly states that applicants are not required to show that other members of the
group––in this context, other family members––were also harmed by the same
persecutor.312 However, it can significantly strengthen the legal theory to
affirmatively proffer an explanation of why they have remained safe.
In order to do so, the key question is what characteristics
distinguish the applicant from family members who were unharmed. In an
unpublished Board decision from 2018, Matter of G-F-N-A-, the
respondent posited that his siblings had not been harmed because they had
a different last name and thus were not readily identifiable as members of
the family.313 In a recent Refugee & Human Rights Clinic case, the client
was substantially older than her siblings. We obtained an affidavit from
an expert indicating that gang members are more likely to target girls when
they have become sexually mature enough to be of interest to them.314
Because the client’s sisters were all under the age of sexual maturity, the
expert hypothesized that this was why they had not yet been harmed.315
Another possible explanation for family members that appear to be living
in safety is that they are in fact not actually safe, but are constantly
moving, in hiding, or have only been exposed to danger for a limited

evidence against nexus to family-based social group); DHS 2016 Brief, supra note 66, at 18
(indicating that evidence of whether the persecution was on account of family membership
should include “of course, any evidence about the circumstances of other family members
and whether they have been targeted on account of their family relationship”). This position
appears to be particularly predominant in the Eighth Circuit, which has consistently used the
fact that other family members were able to remain safely in the country as evidence to deny
petitions for review of family-based asylum claims. See, e.g., Cambara-Cambara v. Lynch,
837 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting that the fact that the petitioners each left daughters
in their country of origin undermined their claim); Aguinada-Lopez v. Lynch, 825 F.3d 407,
409 (8th Cir. 2016) (denying the petition and noting that “extended family” still lived in their
home country); Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753-54 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
petitioner’s siblings and children remained in El Salvador and had not been particularly
targeted). The Eighth Circuit almost seems to require that the entire family as a group have
been targeted. See, e.g., Antonio-Fuentes v. Holder, 764 F.3d 902, 905 (8th Cir. 2014)
(“Fuentes . . . did not establish that gangs specifically targeted his family as a group.”).
312
See, e.g., W.G.A. v. Sessions, 900 F.3d 957, 967 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g denied (Oct. 22,
2018) (nothing that “it was improper for the immigration judge to rely on a lack of harm to
other family members, without more, to find that [petitioner] was not targeted on account of
his kinship ties”); Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 339 (4th Cir. 2014) (finding that “even
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not ‘undermine the reasonableness of [petitioner’s] own fear of persecution’”); Mgoian v
INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1036-37 (9th Cir. 1999).
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time.316 For example, the Fourth Circuit, in Crespin-Valladares v. Holder,
noted that even though the petitioner’s children remained in El Salvador,
the period during which they had been unharmed was only two months
long.317
In addition to developing an explanation of why some family
members were not harmed, practitioners might consider narrowing the
particular social group formulation to exclude individuals who continue to
live in the country safely. In an unpublished 2017 decision a few months
prior to L-E-A-, the Board considered the case of a Salvadoran respondent
who argued the gangs had targeted him for recruitment as the child of a
policeman. In denying the appeal, the Board pointed out that the
respondent’s sister––another member of the particular social group
defined as nuclear family members of the respondent’s father––had not
been harmed by the gangs.318 Per controlling authority, this fact should not
have been dispositive.319 However, given that country conditions
documentation shows that gangs predominantly recruit young men,320 it
may have been a more successful strategy to limit the particular social
group in this case to “male nuclear family members of the respondent’s
father” rather than formulating it as the entire nuclear family.321
6. If the persecutor harmed other individuals outside of the family,
explain how the applicant’s persecution is distinguishable
In a way the converse of the preceding Subsection, where the
persecutor also targeted people that were not members of the family in
question, practitioners should be prepared to incorporate this into the theory
of the case. In the aforementioned 2017 Board decision, another of the
reasons that the Board found no nexus was that the gang members had also
tried to recruit the respondent’s friends rather than just members of the
316

Practitioners should take particular care not to concede that the applicant could live safely
and reasonably in another part of the country, for example by pointing out that it would not
be reasonable to have to constantly move around or remain confined in the house day-andnight. The internal relocation prong of asylum eligibility is outside the scope of this paper
but should be carefully documented as well in all asylum cases.
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320
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social distinction tests.

58

Journal of Law & Public Affairs

[Apr. 2020

particular social group of the respondent’s nuclear family.322 The fact that a
persecutor harmed others should have no impact on the nexus analysis as to
the specific applicant, though adjudicators sometimes use this information to
make inferences about a persecutor’s motivations.323
Therefore, under these circumstances, practitioners should present
evidence that the persecutor treated the respondent differently than other victims
in some way. In this case, the respondent testified that the gang members
mentioned his father by name when they approached him and had an expert
witness testify that the gangs disproportionately targeted family members of
policemen for recruitment.324 These facts support the argument that even if the
gang members persecuted other young men in the community, one central
reason for the respondent’s persecution was his family membership. Perhaps
additional facts could have been presented to further differentiate how the
respondent was treated versus his friends, who were also approached for
recruitment. If the respondent had been harmed more severely––such as
receiving more serious threats or more frequent attempts at recruitment––this
could have further supported the family-based nexus argument.
CONCLUSION
Last year, I was part of a group of students and attorneys that traveled
to the border to volunteer with migrants waiting to enter the United States. It
was eminently clear that Trump’s characterization of asylum seekers as
“stone cold criminals”325 and their applications for asylum as a “big fat con
job”326 could not be further from the truth. Person after person recounted truly
horrific stories, including children threatened with kidnapping, siblings
murdered, and entire families that uprooted their lives to escape abuses that are
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unimaginable in our country. These were not individuals who made the decision
lightly to abandon their homes and undertake the dangerous journey north.327
Attorney General Barr’s decision in Matter of L-E-A- gives
adjudicators who favor denials another excuse to rebuff asylum applicants
and return them to countries where they face serious harm, including death.328
However, the central thesis of this Article is that family-based particular
social group membership is buttressed by decades of legal precedent that
cannot be erased with a stroke of the Attorney General’s pen. People are
being beaten, kidnapped, hunted down, tortured, and killed––not because of
anything that they have done, but because of who their family members are.
Our laws should––and do––protect these individuals.
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